Edited by
Marija Babovic

Are Institutions Providing Human Security?

Trust in Public Institutions
Across the Balkans and Turkey

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The **Cross-Border Citizens' Network for Peace, Inter-Communal Reconciliation and Human Security** is a joint initiative – with partner organizations in Bosnia and Herzegovina (hCa and ORC), Bulgaria (IRIS), Kosovo (CDRP), Montenegro (ZID), Serbia (SeConS) and Turkey (hCa in Turkey) – whose establishment was supported by the European Commission. Within the Network, each member approaches the issue on human security from different perspectives, therefore focusing on a particular aspect (local, civic, regional) and field of activities (advocacy, broader social mobilization, research). Their common denominator, however, is their aim to create security-oriented political culture and build structures within their communities.

Networking aims to strengthen sustainable transnational civic networks as an actor for the preservation of peace, inter-communal reconciliation and human security – at the local, national and regional level – in order to encourage, and improve, the socio-political and legal transformations in the process of European integration of the Balkans and Turkey. Specific objectives of the Network are building social capital, making recommendations for political reforms, as well as networking on the local, regional and EU level.

Within the Network, a series of activities are being conducted such as capacity building, networking, research, advocacy, the preparation of annual and thematic reports as well as the organization of regional and international conferences and summer schools for researchers in the field of human security. More information about the Network: http://cn4hs.org/

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Introduction

Wars in neighboring countries and regions, large movements of refugees, internal ethnic and political conflicts, highly prevalent violence – from child abuse, gender based violence against women to terrorist actions – election irregularities, corruption, economic crisis, exclusion and poverty these are some of the threats to human security in the region of Balkans and Turkey. War in Syria, as well as conflict and post-conflict problems from Middle East and some parts of Central Asia spill over to Turkey and further to Balkans. Large influx of migrants transiting from Turkey through Balkans to European Union in quest for international protection is only one of the most prominent examples. Exposure to multiple risks of these people and often with deadly consequences was one of the major threat to human security during last years. Economic crisis in Greece with devastating effects on economic and social security of people is another major event that undermined wellbeing of people in the region. Recent political crisis and conflicts in Macedonia, election irregularities in Serbia, political instability in Bosnia and Herzegovina, latent and manifest interethnic conflicts in Kosovo, South and South-Western Serbia, are another set of sources of insecurity. In the context of low economic activity, high unemployment, low living standard and prevalent poverty, these treats pose high challenges for provision of human security and social stability in the region.

The role of public institutions, among other things, is to provide secure and stabile social environment, or directly to protect individuals and groups from certain insecurities. In ideal world, they should regulate areas of social life in effective way so the key human rights of people are provided, including rights that are in the core of human security – to be free from fear, from want and to be able to live in dignity. There exactly lies main question to which this report attempts to answer: are the public institutions in the Region capable to effectively perform their role and to deliver human security and wellbeing to people? Do people across the region trust in institutions and their capability to perform their role effectively?

The report is prepared by the Citizens Network for Peace, Reconciliation and Human Security in Balkans and Turkey, as part of the action supported by European Commission. The motivation to prepare this report is grounded in the four years of experience accumulated during the implementation of the project. Interacting with many stakeholders across the Region we became aware that policy makers and public officials are not aware of the importance of their policies and services for provision of human security. On the other hand, citizens and various groups of people with whom our member organizations have been working in the field show that human security approach of policies and public services is highly needed. Therefore,

this report should depict the **existing gap** and to provide evidence for advocating for more effective institutions that can provide (directly – through service provision, or indirectly – through creating appropriate conditions) human security in societies or communities under their responsibility.

The report is consisting of two main parts. In the first part, regional overview of the trust in institutions is presented, based on secondary data from various available surveys in the Region. In addition to cross-country comparisons, key findings are presented for each country presently covered by the network: Turkey, Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. Due to the differences in conceptualization and methodologies, these surveys are not fully comparable, but with appropriate caution, they can provide basic picture on confidence people have in key institutions.

Second part of the report contains country specific case studies. Each of the case studies tries to depict with more details some specific problem of institutional delivery of human security. Some of them are focused on specific institution and try to shed light how people relate that institution to the provision of specific aspects of their security, where are gaps in the work of these institutions which undermine their trust. In this group are case studies on trust in police in Bulgaria, trust in financial institutions in Kosovo and trust in institutions providing security on labour market in Montenegro. Second group of case studies are focused not on specific institution, but on particular group which experiences specific threats to their human security and explores how this group sees and uses institutions in building their response to the insecurities. Case studies on trust in institutions of displaced youth living in collective centres in Bosnia and Herzegovina and trust in institutions providing security for asylum seekers in Serbia belong to this group of studies. Case study for Turkey represents slightly different type as it tries to explore the role of institutions and interaction between citizens and institutions in regard to specific case of workplace accident that caused dozens of deaths of workers in one local community. Case studies were conducted based on key principle of case study methodology – 'data triangulation', meaning that they combined desk and secondary data research with small-scale qualitative research with different actors in order to explore selected aspect of trust in institutions in relation to specific aspect of human security.

Trust in institutions as human security issue

The question of the trust in institutions became important in contemporary societies with increased doubts that some of the basic institutions of modern societies can deliver stability, prosperity and wellbeing even in the most developed and prosperous countries. As Barbara Misztal noticed "the emergence of widespread consciousness that existing bases for social cooperation, solidarity and consensus have been eroded and there is a need to search for new alternatives" (Misztal, 1996: 3). Question of trust became more salient during last several decades[1] due to the series of factors (Sztompka 1999): the dependence of our future on decision making (Luhmann, 1994)[2], increased interdependence between and within the societies[3], the complexity of social world (institutions, organizations, technologies) which increased so much that became impenetrable to ordinary people and often to experts, growing anonymity and impersonality, more dynamic communities with growing presence of unfamiliar people (migrations, tourism, travel). Trust becomes necessary as we have to deal with such complexities – to delegate decisions, to accept solutions brought by others, etc. – or we would not be able to act in a such a complex social environment (Sztompka, 1999).

Trust is important because it serves as the 'creator of collective power' enabling government to make decisions and commit resources without having to resort to coercion or obtain the specific approval of citizens for every decision (Gamson 1968: 42). Trust is important dimension of civic culture which assumes 'a widely distributed sense of political competence and mutual trust in citizenry (Almong and Verba 1980, quoted from Sztompka). Trust is defined as 'a simplifying strategy that enables individuals to adapt to complex social environment and thereby benefit from increased opportuni-

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1   In the social sciences, topic of trust became important since late 1970s. In 1979 Niklas Luhmann published and influential analysis of trust. He related trust to growing complexity, uncertainty and risk which characterize contemporary societies. Later, in the 1990s, Anthony Giddens, Ulrich, Beck and Schott Lash analysed trust as the characteristic feature of late modernity, elaborating on Luhmannian themes of complexity, uncertainty and risk (Stztompka, 1999).

2   As Sztompka noted, 'we have moved from societies based on fate to those moved by human agency' (Sztompka, 1999: 11). The politicians have to trust the viability and acceptance of proposed policies, common people have to trust all those who are involved in 'representative activities' acting on their behalf' (Dahrendorf, 1990, quoted from Sztompka, 1999:12).

3   Differentiation and specialization of roles, functions, occupations, lifestyles. As our dependence on the cooperation of others grows, so does the importance of trust in their reliability. As Misztal noted 'the ongoing process of global interdependency will only increase the demand for trust as an essential condition for cooperation' (Misztal 1996: 269).

ties' (Earle and Cvetkovich, 1995: 8, quoted from Sztompka, 2003). 'Trust is a bet about the future contingent actions of others (Sztompka, 1999: 25).' This means that trust consists of two main components: beliefs and commitments. Trust is based on expectations how other actor will perform in some occasion. But it also includes the commitment through action (placing a bet), which means that based on that expectation we are choosing our action, before we can monitor if and how the action of other actor happened.

There are several primary targets of trust: other persons, social roles (regardless their incumbents some roles evoke trust – i.e. professor, priest, judge– or distrust – i.e. public officials, politicians in case of widespread corruption, etc.), social group, institutions and organizations, system. The amount of trust that people vest in various institutions differ among societies and varies during the time.

Particularly complex is the situation in Balkans where the former socialist societies had to transform the institutions after the fall of socialism, and in most of the cases these transformative processes were marked with serious difficulties (Lazic, Pešić, 2012; Cvejić, et al, 2011; Thomas, Bojicic-Dzelilovic, 2015; Deacon, Stubbs, 2007). Even Bulgaria, the EU Member State, shows severe problems in the attempts to reform institutions according to EU model of the 'rule of law' (Dimitrova 2015). Former Yugoslav countries: Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, attempt with more or less success to progress on the road to EU by reforming institutions in line with that standard. However, these reforms are faced with many obstacles – from historical inheritance of weak democratic institutions and rule of law, through pervasive clientelistic networks, capture of public resources (including institutions) by political elite, prevalent corruption and ineffectiveness in service delivery due to the low human or material resources (Lazic, Pesic, 2012; Cvejic, 2016, Besic, 2016).

Human security presents a relatively new paradigm for approaching the problem of security. In contrast to traditional concepts of security which revolve around the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the state, human security recognizes that the security of individual humans is essential in building stable and peaceful societies. This individual security is multifaceted and depends upon the inter-relatedness of multiple different phenomena. Human security focuses on addressing and preventing risks to individuals' and groups' physical, material and psychological being, summarized as ensuring freedom from fear, freedom from want and dignity. UNDP approach to human security distinguishes seven key areas or dimensions of security which are interconnected: economic, political, health, food, environmental, personal, community and political security (UNTFHS, 2009). In the more qualitative approach to human security developed by scholars from London School of Economics, emphasize is on the lived experiences of insecurity and

the interconnection of threats and is concerned the downside and extreme risks. The focus is on understanding of the relation between the severity of a threat and an individual's capacity to ameliorate it, rather than representing an 'objective', measurable phenomenon. Hence the importance of how vulnerability is articulated by those affected (Kaldor, M, 2011).

In both instance, human security threats are highly specific, and geographically, historically and culturally contextualized, it is important to stress that human security is mixed with other approaches such as human rights or human development, rather, human security threats are those vulnerabilities which are manifested in the conjunction of these different insecurities.

The available research on trust in public institutions does not approach the issue of trust from the human security perspective. Therefore, in the first part of the report, the insights in trust will be more general. Country specific case studies, however, approach the question specifically from human security perspective, enabling deeper insights in the content of trust: perception of specific treats to security experienced by certain groups, their expectations related to the institutions which should provide protection from these treats.

Trust in institutions across the region

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Regional overview of public trust

Trust in institutions across the Region is generally low and in many aspects, shows similarities with average levels of trust in EU. From the following table, we can see that cases in which majority of citizens trust to particular institutions are not very common. This includes: trust in EU institutions in Bulgaria and Kosovo, trust in local authorities in Kosovo, trust in National Parliament in Turkey, trust in police in BiH, Kosovo and Turkey and trust in army in all observed countries except Bulgaria and Kosovo (which has no army). In all other cases only minority of citizens has confidence in key national institutions. Important is to notice that no national/central level government is trusted by the majority of citizens. What makes EU average distinctive from the region is higher trust in judicial system.

Table 1: Levels of trust in key institutions in Turkey, Bulgaria, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo, and EU 28

Institutions	EU28 average	Bulgaria	Turkey	Serbia	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Montenegro	Kosovo
EU institutions	orange	green	orange	orange	orange	orange	green
National government	orange	orange	orange	orange	orange	orange	orange
National parliament	orange	red	green	orange	orange	orange	orange
Judiciary	green	orange	green	orange	orange	orange	orange
Police	green	orange	green	orange	green	orange	green
Army	green	orange	green	green	green	green	N/A
Local authorities	orange	orange	orange	red	orange	orange	green
Political parties	red	red	orange	red	orange	red	orange

Legend:

🟥 Very low level of trust – less than 20% of citizens trusts to the institution

🟧 Low level of trust – more than 20% but less than 50% of citizens trusts to the institution

🟩 High level of trust – more than 50% of citizens trusts to the institution

However, here is important to note the caution in regard to the levels of trust in Turkey due to the recent political events related to the unsuccessful coup attempt and consequential political events and processes. Even before that, some discrepancies could be noted, particularly concerning the levels of trust in judiciary. While the previous table and following graph are presented Eurobarometer data (for the reason of comparability with other countries) it is worth to show additional insights obtained through various national surveys which indicate lower level of trust in judiciary and sharp decline in trust in judiciary during last decade. According to the 2011 Research on Socio-political Tendencies in Turkey [4] the courts were held in esteem by only 38,8 % of the respondents, but this rate decreased to 37.2 % in 2012, and 26.5 % in 2014. According to the same poll, 59,7% responded negative to the question 'if they believe the Turkish courts are independent?' The rate of the respondents who believe that the courts are independent is only 24.2 % according to this survey. OECD survey[5] indicates the changing tendencies in trust from 2007 to 2014. According to this survey the confidence in judicial system in Turkey decreased from 70 % in 2007 to less than 50 % in 2014. Thus, while the trust in judiciary system was higher than the average of OECD countries in 2007, it got lower than average in 2014 (OECD, 2015: 171).

More detailed cross-country insights in the level of trust are presented in the following graph. Here we can see the share of citizens who declared that they trust to particular institution.

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4   Türkiye Sosyal-Siyasal Eğilimler Araştırması, research biannually implemented by Kadir Has University.

5   OECD *Government at a Glance Report* for 2015.

Chart 1: Share of citizens who trust to key institutions in Balkan countries, Turkey and EU-28 (average), 2015[6]

Source: for Bulgaria, Turkey, Serbia and Montenegro – Eurobarometer, for Bosnia and Herzegovina Analitika poll, for Kosovo Riinvest poll.

Main tendencies observed from presented data lead to several conclusions:

- Trust in EU institutions is higher among countries from Balkan and in Turkey than it is average level of trust recorded among citizens of EU-28. Highest level of trust in EU institutions is recorded in Kosovo, followed by Bulgaria. Although Eurobarometer data indicate that trust in EU institutions is expressed by majority of citizens only in Bulgaria and Kosovo, this should not be misunderstood as low acceptance of joining EU. In all countries in the region, majority of citizens (i.e. 67% in Turkey, 65% in Montenegro, 58% in Serbia) holds that their countries will benefit from EU membership.

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6   Data are not fully comparable due to the origin from different sources. Data for EU 28, Turkey, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro are fully comparable and they are taken from the Eurobarometer survey (2015). Data for Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo are taken from national large scale polls which were using similar instruments to collect data on trust (Analitika, 2015, Riinvest, 2014). Reference year for all countries is 2015 except for Kosovo, for which data are from 2014.

- Among all compared countries, generally level of trust in institutions is the lowest in Bulgaria in almost all dimensions, except the confidence in EU institutions.
- In Turkey trust is more evenly distributed across different institutions (with caution in regard to the judiciary, previously explained), while in the Balkan countries there are clear inclinations to trust more to certain institutions and to distrust the others.
- People trust more security institutions than political institutions. Confidence is higher in army and police than in national parliaments and governments. Also, trust is higher in army than in police.
- The least trusted institutions are political parties which poses serious questions of representation mechanisms. And this is not manifested only in Turkey and WB countries but across the EU as well.
- There is also visible tendency in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bulgaria that citizens trust more to the local or regional authorities than central/state level authorities, although levels of trust are not high (except in the case of Kosovo).

The confidence in institutions is closely related to the perception of the institutional capability to perform their roles based on law, in unbiased, legal and effective manner. Rule of law is mainly understood as set of legal and political mechanisms sustained by a favorable composition of underlying societal interests. The rule of law requires that government officials and citizens are bound by and act consistently with the law. Government officials are limited by law in two ways: they must comply with positive laws and they can change the laws, but there are limitations for lawmaking activities imposed by laws and by widely accepted set of human rights (Vukovic, 2015). They are required to consult and conform to the law while taking actions, and legal rules provide publicly available requirements and standards that can be used to hold government officials accountable during and after their actions are taken (Tamanaha, 2009, cf. from Vukovic, 2015). The World bank ranking on rule of law index indicates relative progress in the countries in the Region. The index reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence[7].

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7   http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home

Chart 2: Ranking of countries in the rule of law (percentile rank among all countries, 0-minimum, 100-maximum)

Prevailing is the trend of increased perception of rule of law in the Region. In all countries this is visible trend but in some it is particularly sharp after 2000, such as in Serbia and Montenegro. Highest perception of the rule of law in 2014 is recorded in Turkey and Montenegro, followed by Serbia and Bulgaria.

The progress is more modest and sometimes contradictory in regard to corruption, according to World Bank data. This ranking system of countries in control of corruption reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 'capture' of the state by elites and private interests. As we can see from the following graph, lowest starting point in 2000 had Serbia, for which the progress can be estimated as relatively sharp until 2008. Other countries show more moderate progress, while in Turkey it is recorded decline between 2008 and 2014. Interestingly, Bulgaria has experienced decline between 2000 and 2008 and then almost lack of change after 2008, during its membership in EU.

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8   http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home

Chart 3: Ranking of countries in the control of corruption (percentile rank among all countries, 0-minimum, 100-maximum)

Source: World Bank[9]

Another important aspect of the context in which trust in institutions is established or maintained, particularly from the perspective of human security in its basic forms of physical security, is the perception of political stability and absence of violence and terrorism. The perception of political stability is the highest in Montenegro, then Serbia and Bulgaria, it is much lower in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo and it is the lowest in Turkey.

Chart 4: Political stability and absence of violence and terrorism ranking

Source: World Bank[10]

9   http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home
10   http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home

There is no unambiguous evidence of direct correlation between levels of trust and development of democracy. There is also evidence from research that in non-democratic institutional settings, in societies with pervasive informal relations and clientelistic practices there can be present significant level of trust. The difference is that this trust is more related to the informal than formal institutions (Torsello, 2012). On the other hand, in the most developed democratic societies, trust in public institutions is higher. According to the democracy index[11], Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro are ranked as flawed democracies, while Bosnia and Herzegovina and Turkey are classified as hybrid regimes (data for Kosovo were not available).

Table 2: Ranking on democracy index

Democracy index							
Data	Score	Electoral process and pluralism	Functioning of government	Political participation	Political culture	Civil liberties	Category
Sweden	9.45	9.58	9.64	8.33	10.00	9.71	Full Democracy
Bulgaria	7.14	9.17	6.07	7.22	5.00	8.24	Flawed Democracy
Serbia	6.71	9.17	5.36	6.67	5.00	7.35	Flawed Democracy
Montenegro	6.01	7.92	5.71	5.00	4.38	7.06	Flawed Democracy
BIH	4.83	6.50	2.93	3.89	4.38	6.47	Hybrid regime
Turkey	5.12	6.67	5.36	5.00	5.63	2.94	Hybrid regime

Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index 2015

Determinants of low trust in public institutions in the Region

Why do not people trust that contemporary institutions in their societies perform effective role on behalf of citizens, contributing to secure environment? This question is not easy to answer, but a lot of research has

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11   The Democracy Index measures the state of democracy in 167 countries. It is based on 60 indicators grouped in five different categories measuring pluralism, civil liberties and political culture. The index categorizes countries as one of four regime types: full democracies, flawed democracies, hybrid regimes and authoritarian regimes.

been conducted in this area, pointing to specific historical legacies and contemporary factors.

Public trust in government is premised on a wide range of economic, social and political interactions between citizens and government. The literature commonly identifies four groups of factors that have a dominant influence: culture, institutional setting, economic and social factors, and performance of institutions. As some researchers found, there are two principal determinants of trust in institutions: perception of freedom and fairness and evaluation of economic performance (Mishler, Rose, 1997).

Another stream of the literature indicates more deeply rooted determinants that are related to the interplay between formal and informal institutions and practices. As some authors noted, governance always happens 'somewhere between the poles of formality and informality' (Hayoz, 2013: 52). In this part of the world, in the Region of Balkans and Turkey, formal and informal institutions and practices are strongly interrelated and often formal institutions are entrenched in informal networks and practices. In such a context, important factors of low trust in public institutions can be found in pervasive and strong informal networks and practices grounded in clientelism and political patronage (which prevent non-biased, neutral and citizens' oriented functioning of the institutions), often and sometimes systematically involving corruption, lack of civic structures and cultures more externally than internally driven reforms, with EU accession conditionality that is not sufficiently effective and not without internal weaknesses. It is important to look closer to these factors, as any future action focused on promotion of good governance and the rule of law in the Region has to take them into account.

Historical legacies are marked by late and uncompleted modernization processes, weak role of states captured by elites, memories of communist/socialist or other authoritarian rule which uses institutions for reproduction of elite, system or for more immediate gains of members of power circles/networks. As some researchers emphasized, informality is important feature of post-socialist societies and institutions were built during transition not 'on the ruins of communism' but 'with the ruins of communism' (Stark, 1996: 995), which means that informal power networks continued to play crucial role in their creation and maintenance. The causes of weak institutional performance are numerous. After the fall of socialism, the retreat of the state had occurred faster than legislation to control market activity could be passed and implemented. Legislation was often subverted by the agents within the state who are interested in 'grabbing' state resources in their own interests or tunneling out state institutions from the inside (Sik, 1994). Particularly devastating effects were witnessed in the former Yugoslav countries which experienced full devastation of institutional framework during the dissolution wars (Bolcic, 1994, Lazic, 1994). New institutions had to

be built after the conflicts based on these legacies, but on the new, strongly ethicized structures, and as result new states that emerged in the region were shaped in specific versions of political capitalism in which economy and political institutions are strongly (often informally) regulated by the political elites (Antonic, 1993, 2006, Arandarenko, 2000, Lazic and Pesic, 2012, Cvejic, 2016).

In the famous study on why nations fail, Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) categorized political institutions as inclusive (developmental) and extractive (predatory). Inclusive institutions enable prosperity, economic development and sustainable democratic institutions. On the other hand, extractive institutions are created to please the interests of political elites rather than the general population with the negative effect on development of inclusive economic institutions and society as a whole. If there is no economic development, increase of living standard and quality of life for citizens, they would tend to perceive governance institutions more predatory than inclusive. Particularly, when corruption is pervasive and not sanctioned such is the case in WB countries. Actually, the researchers found that trust in public institutions depends to a great extent upon citizens' perception of corruption. The stronger perception of corruption, the greater was the loss of trust in political and legal institutions (Wallace and Latcheva, 2006). Among countries more successful in transition it was noted trend towards positive spiral of increasing formalisation, trust and decline of perceptions of corruption, while among countries with less successful transition, it was perceived trend of negative spiral of increasing informalisation, perception of corruption and loss of trust in institutions (Wallace and Latcheva, 2006).

In addition to this problem, there are even more complex difficulties related to the state building, such in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, due to the constitutional set-up of the country whereby public administration is regulated at multiple levels of government (state, entity and cantonal). This, coupled with the absence of a formally guaranteed system of subordination reduces harmonisation and gives strength to informal power competition between policy makers at various levels of administration. In addition to this, high political competition prevents political elites of engaging in more profound public administration reform as this will mean reduction of employment in public sector, growing dissatisfaction of voters and undermining structural foundations of their power. The process of negative selection based on clientelism, and nepotism decreases human resources needed for reforms. Therefore, it is not surprising that citizens perceive lack of any progress (40% of respondents) or very modest progress (31%) in this area of reforms (Transparency International, 2014).

When there is lack of the confidence in institutions, people tend to rely more on informal networks. Evidence from various research in the region indicate that far more people in post-socialist countries rely on informal

social capital and networks, such as friends, family members, acquaintances, than people in developed capitalist countries (Rose, et al, 1997, Grodeland, 2007, Aliyev, 2015). However, another form of social networks and capital is of key importance to the improved governance, creation of reliable institutions and advanced social accountability – organized and active civil society. Civil society encompasses organization, social movements, informal groups, civil participation by individuals in public and political life, and a democratic public sphere. Vibrant civil society is necessary for fostering good governance, the rule of law or democracy (Vukovic, 2015).

Therefore, the issue of building trust in institutions is not only the issue of one sided institutional reform, particularly externally driven through EU conditionality, but it is the issue of creating the structures that will enable institutional building and institutional performance in the socially accountable setting, which assumes great role of civil society.

Uvod

Ratovi u susednim zemljama i regionima, velika kretanja izbeglica, unutrašnji etnički i politički sukobi, široko rasprostranjeno nasilje – od zlostavljanja dece, rodno zasnovanog nasilja nad ženama do terorističkih napada – izborne nepravilnosti, korupcija, ekonomska kriza, isključenost i siromaštvo, samo su neke od opasnosti po ljudsku bezbednost u regionu Balkana i Turskoj. Rat u Siriji, kao i problemi tokom i nakon sukoba na Bliskom istoku i u nekim delovima centralne Azije prelivaju se na Tursku i dalje na Balkan. Veliki priliv migranata iz Turske u tranzitu preko Balkana u potrazi za međunarodnom zaštitom u Evropskoj uniji samo je jedan od najistaknutijih primera. Jedna od glavnih opasnosti po ljudsku bezbednost tokom poslednjih godina je izloženost ljudi višestrukim rizicima, često sa smrtnim posledicama. Ekonomska kriza u Grčkoj, sa razornim dejstvima po ekonomsku i socijalnu bezbednost ljudi, takođe je jedan od važnih događaja koji je podrivao blagostanje ljudi u regionu. Nedavna politička kriza i sukobi u Makedoniji, izborne nepravilnosti u Srbiji, politička nestabilnost u Bosni i Hercegovini, latentni i otvoreni međuetnički sukobi na Kosovu, u Južnoj i Jugozapadnoj Srbiji, su još jedan skup izvora nesigurnosti. U kontekstu niske ekonomske aktivnosti, visoke stope nezaposlenosti, niskog životnog standarda i preovlađujućeg siromaštva, te pretnje predstavljaju visoke izazove za osiguranje ljudske bezbednosti i društvene stabilnosti u regionu.

Uloga javnih institucija, između ostalog, jeste da obezbede sigurno i stabilno društveno okruženje, ili da direktno zaštite pojedince i grupe od određenih nesigurnosti. U idealnom svetu, trebalo bi da delotvorno uređuju oblasti društvenog života kako bi ljudima obezbedile uživanje osnovnih ljudskih prava, uključujući i prava koja su od suštinskog značaja za ljudsku bezbednost – pravo na slobodu od straha i nemaštine i pravo na dostojanstven život. Upravo se ovde krije glavno pitanje na koje ovaj izveštaj nastoji da odgovori: da li su javne institucije u regionu u stanju da efikasno obavljaju svoju ulogu i da obezbeđuju ljudsku bezbednost i blagostanje ljudi? Da li ljudi u regionu imaju poverenje u institucije i njihovu sposobnost da efikasno obavljaju svoju ulogu?

Ovaj izveštaj pripremila je Prekogranična mreža za mir, međusobno pomirenje i ljudsku bezbednost na Balkanu i u Turskoj, u okviru mere koju je podržala Evropska komisija. Motivacija za izradu ovog izveštaja zasnovana je na četiri godine iskustva stečenog tokom realizacije projekta. U interakciji sa mnogim akterima u regionu postali smo svesni da kreatori politika i javni funkcioneri nisu svesni u kojoj meri su njihove politike i usluge važni za osiguranje ljudske bezbednosti. S druge strane, građani i različite grupe ljudi sa kojima naše članice sarađuju na terenu pokazuju da je preko potrebno da ljudska bezbednost bude deo pristupa politika i javnih službi. Stoga,

ovaj izveštaj treba da prikaže **postojeću prazninu** i da obezbedi dokaze za zalaganje za delotvornije institucije koje mogu da osiguraju (neposredno – pružanjem usluga, ili posredno – stvaranjem odgovarajućih uslova) ljudsku bezbednost u društvima ili zajednicama u njihovoj nadležnosti.

Izveštaj se sastoji od dva glavna dela. U prvom delu je dat prikaz poverenja u institucije na nivou regiona zasnovan na sekundarnim podacima iz različitih dostupnih istraživanja u regionu. Pored poređenja zemalja, predstavljeni su i ključni nalazi za svaku zemlju koja je obuhvaćena mrežom: Turska, Bugarska, Srbija, Crna Gora, Bosna i Hercegovina i Kosovo. Usled razlika u konceptima i metodologijama, ova istraživanja nisu u potpunosti uporediva, ali uz izvestan oprez, mogu da daju osnovnu sliku o poverenju građana u ključne institucije.

Drugi deo izveštaja sadrži studije slučaja koje su karakteristične za određenu zemlju. Sve studije slučaja pokušavaju da detaljnije opišu neki određeni problem koji institucije imaju u obezbeđivanju ljudske bezbednosti. Neke studije su usmerene na određenu instituciju i pokušavaju da osvetle način na koji građani tu instituciju povezuju sa osiguranjem određenih aspekata njihove bezbednosti, gde su praznine u radu tih institucija koje podrivaju poverenje građana u te institucije. U ovoj grupi studija su studije slučaja o poverenju u policiju u Bugarskoj, poverenju u finansijske institucije na Kosovu i poverenju u institucije koje osiguravaju bezbednost na tržištu rada u Crnoj Gori. Druga grupa studija slučaja nije usmerena na određene institucije, već na konkretnu grupu ljudi koja doživljava određene pretnje ljudskoj bezbednosti i istražuje kakvo je viđenje institucija te grupe i kako ih ona koristi da definiše odgovor na nesigurnost. Studije slučaja o poverenju u institucije raseljenih mladih koji žive u kolektivnim centrima u Bosni i Hercegovini i o poverenju u institucije koje osiguravaju bezbednost azilanata u Srbiji pripadaju ovoj grupi studija. Studija slučaja u Turskoj je malo drugačijeg tipa, jer pokušava da istraži ulogu institucija i interakciju između građana i institucija u konkretnom slučaju nesreće na radnom mestu koja je za posledicu imala smrt desetine radnika iz jedne lokalne zajednice. Studije slučaja bazirane su na ključnom principu metodologije studije slučaja – „trangulaciji podataka", što znači da su desk istraživanje i sekundarno istraživanje kombinovani sa kvalitativnim istraživanjem manjeg obima sa različitim akterima da bi se istražili izabrani aspekti poverenja u institucije u odnosu na određeni aspekt ljudske bezbednosti.

Poverenje u institucije kao pitanje ljudske bezbednosti

Pitanje poverenja u institucije postalo je važno u savremenim društvima usled sve veće sumnje da neke od osnovnih institucija modernih društava mogu da ponude stabilnost, prosperitet i blagostanje, čak i u najrazvijenijim i najprosperitetnijim zemljama. Kao što je Barbara Misztal primetila „sve je veća svest o tome da su postojeće osnove društvene saradnje, solidarnosti i konsenzusa narušene i da je potrebno tražiti nove alternative" (Misztal, 1996: 3). Pitanje poverenja je u poslednjih nekoliko decenija dobilo na značaju[12] usled niza faktora (Sztompka 1999): zavisnosti naše budućnosti od donošenja odluka (Luhmann, 1994)[13], povećane međuzavisnosti između i unutar društava[14], usložnjavanja društvenog sveta (institucija, organizacija, tehnologija) u toj meri da je postao nedokučiv običnim ljudima a često i stručnjacima, porasta anonimnosti i bezličnosti, sve više dinamičnijim zajednicama zbog prisustva sve većeg broja nepoznatih ljudi (migracija, turizma, putovanja). Poverenje postaje neophodno jer moramo da se izborimo sa složenim pitanjima – da delegiramo odluke, da prihvatimo rešenja koja donose drugi, itd. – ili u suprotnom nećemo biti u stanju da delujemo u takvom složenom društvenom okruženju (Sztompka, 1999).

Poverenje je važno jer ima ulogu „tvorca kolektivne snage" koji vladi omogućava donošenje odluka i raspoređivanje resursa bez pribegavanja prinudi ili pribavljanja posebnog odobrenja od građana za svaku odluku (Gamson 1968: 42). Poverenje je važna dimenzija građanske kulture koja podrazumeva „široko rasprostranjen osećaj političke kompetentnosti i međusobnog poverenja vlasti i građana" (Almong i Verba 1980, citirano iz Sztompka). Poverenje se definiše kao „strategija za pojednostavljenje koja pojedincima omogućava da se prilagode kompleksnom društvenom okruže-

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12   U društvenim naukama, tema poverenja dobija na značaju kasni 1970-ih. 1979. godine Niklas Luhmann je objavio uticajnu analizu poverenja. On je poverenje povezao sa usložnjavanjem, neizvesnošću i rizikom koji karakterišu savremeno društvo. Kasnije, 1990-ih, Anthony Giddens, Ulrich, Beck and Schott Lash su analizirali poverenje kao karakterističnu odliku kasnog modernizma, kada su razrađivali Luhmannove teme kompleksnosti, neizvesnosti i rizika (Stztompka, 1999).

13   Kao što kaže Sztompka, „prešli smo sa društava zasnovanih na sudbini na ona koje pokreće delovanje čoveka" (Sztompka, 1999: 11). Političari moraju da veruju da će predložene politike biti održive i prihvaćene, obični ljudi moraju da veruju svima koji se bave „zastupništvom" koji postupaju u njihovo ime" (Dahrendorf, 1990, citat iz Sztompka, 1999:12).

14   Diferencijacija i specijalizacija uloga, funkcija, zanimanja, načina života. Što više zavisimo od saradnje sa drugima, to je veći značaj poverenja u njihovu pouzdanost. Kao što kaže Misztal „tekući proces globalne međuzavisnosti samo će povećati potražnju za poverenjem kao bitnim uslovom za saradnju" (Misztal 1996: 269).

nju i samim tim da imaju koristi od većeg broja prilika" (Earle i Cvetkovich, 1995: 8, citirano iz Sztompka, 2003). „Poverenje je klađenje na buduće potencijalne radnje drugih (Sztompka, 1999: 25)". To znači da poverenje ima dve glavne komponente: verovanja i obaveza. Poverenje se zasniva na očekivanjima u pogledu načina postupanja druge strane u određenoj prilici. S tim što, poverenje uključuje i preuzimanje obaveze izvršenjem određene radnje (polaganja opklade), što znači da mi na osnovu tog očekivanja biramo kako ćemo postupati, pre nego što smo u mogućnosti da pratimo da li je, i na koji način, postupila druga strana.

Postoji nekoliko institucija od najvećeg poverenja: drugi pojedinci, društvene uloge (neke uloge izazivaju poverenje bez obzira na njihove nosioce – npr. profesor, sveštenik, sudija – ili nepoverenje – npr. javni funkcioneri i političari u slučaju široko rasprostranjene korupcije, itd.), društvena grupa, institucije i organizacije, sistem. Količina poverenja koje građani ukazuju raznim institucijama razlikuje se među društvima i varira tokom vremena.

Situacija je naročito složena na Balkanu gde su bivša socijalistička društva morala da transformišu institucije nakon pada socijalizma; ovi procesi transformacije su, u većini slučajeva, bili obeleženi ozbiljnim teškoćama (Lazic, Pešić, 2012; Cvejić, 2010; Thomas, Bojicic-Dželilović, 2015; Deacon, Stubbs, 2007). Čak se i Bugarska, država članica EU, suočava sa ozbiljnim problemima u pokušaju da reformiše institucije po EU modelu „vladavine prava"' (Dimitrova 2015). Zemlje bivše Jugoslavije: Srbija, Crna Gora, Bosna i Hercegovina i Kosovo, pokušavaju, sa više ili manje uspeha, da reformisanjem institucija u skladu sa EU standardom napreduju na putu ka EU. Međutim, u tim reformama nailaze na mnoge prepreke – od istorijskog nasleđa slabih demokratskih institucija i vladavine prava, preko sveprisutnih klijentelističkih mreža, zauzimanja javnih resursa (uključujući institucija) od strane političke elite, široko rasprostranjene korupcije i neefikasnosti u pružanju usluga usled nedovoljnih ljudskih ili materijalnih resursa (Lazić, Pešić, 2012; Cvejić, 2015, Bešlić, 2016).

Ljudska bezbednost je relativno nova paradigma za pristup problemu bezbednosti. U poređenju sa tradicionalnim konceptima bezbednosti koji počivaju na teritorijalnom integritetu i suverenitetu države, ljudska bezbednost zasniva se na tome da je bezbednost svakog pojedinca ključna za stvaranje mirnih i stabilnih društava. Ova bezbednost pojedinca je višestruko uzrokovana i zavisi od međusobne povezanosti većeg broja različitih fenomena. Ljudska bezbednost se fokusira na utvrđivanje i sprečavanje rizika koji prete pojedincima ili grupama kako u fizičkom, materijalnom tako i u psihološkom smislu. Ukratko ovaj pristup pokušava da osigura slobodu od straha, slobodu od nemaštine i pravo na dostojanstven život. Pristup UNDP-a ljudskoj bezbednosti identifikuje sedam glavnih komponenti ili dimenzija bezbednosti koje su međusobno povezane: ekonomska bezbednost, zdravstvena bezbednost, bezbednost u pogledu hrane i bezbednost životne sredine, lična

bezbednost, bezbednost zajednice i politička bezbednost (UNTFHS, 2009). U kvalitativnom pristupu ljudskoj bezbednosti, koji su razvili naučnici sa Londonske škole ekonomije, naglasak je na proživljenim iskustvima nesigurnosti i međusobnoj povezanosti različitih pretnji, i interesovanje je usmereno na probleme i ekstremne rizike. Ovde je fokus više na razumevanju odnosa između ozbiljnosti pretnje i sposobnosti pojedinca da se sa njom izbori, nego na „objektivnoj", merljivoj pojavi. U tome leži važnost praćenja načina na koji se ugroženi bore sa ranjivošću (Kaldor, M. 2011).

Kod oba pristupa, pretnje ljudskoj bezbednosti su veoma specifične i geografski, istorijski i kulturološki uokvirene. Važno je naglasiti da se ljudska bezbednost često meša sa drugim pristupima kao što su pretnje ljudskim pravima ili ljudskom razvoju; pretnje ljudskoj bezbednosti su u stvari upravo one ranjivosti koje se manifestuju spojem ove dve vrste nesigurnosti.

Dostupna istraživanja o poverenju u javne institucije ne pristupaju pitanju poverenja iz perspektive ljudske bezbednosti. Stoga će u prvom delu izveštaja uvidi u poverenje biti uopšteniji. Studije slučaja o određenoj zemlji, međutim, pristupaju ovom pitanju upravo iz perspektive ljudske bezbednosti, omogućavajući dublje uvide u sadržaj poverenja: u to kakva je percepcija pojedinih grupa o opasnosti po bezbednost, koja su njihova očekivanja u vezi sa institucijama koje treba da zaštite od ovih pretnji.

Poverenje u institucije u regionu

Regionalni prikaz poverenja građana u institucije

Poverenje u institucije širom regiona je generalno loše i u mnogim aspektima slično prosečnom nivou poverenja u EU. Iz tabele u nastavku teksta možemo videti da su retki slučajevi da većina građana veruje određenoj instituciji. To obuhvata: poverenje u EU institucije u Bugarskoj i na Kosovu, poverenje u lokalne vlasti na Kosovu, poverenje u Narodnu skupštinu u Turskoj, poverenje u policiju u BiH, na Kosovu i Turskoj, i poverenje u vojsku u svim zemljama osim Bugarske i Kosova (koje nema vojsku). U svim ostalim slučajevima, samo manji broj građana ima poverenje u glavne državne institucije. Važno je primetiti da nijedan državni/centralni nivo vlasti ne uživa poverenje većine građana. Ono po čemu se EU prosek izdvaja od regiona je veće poverenje u pravosudni sistem.

Tabela 1: Nivo poverenja u glavne institucije u Turskoj, Bugarskoj, Srbiji, Bosni i Hercegovini, Crnoj Gori, Kosovu i EU-28

Institucije	EU-28 (prosek)	Bugarska	Turska	Srbija	Bosna i Hercegovina	Crna Gora	Kosovo
EU institucije	🟧	🟩	🟧	🟧	🟧	🟧	🟩
Vlada	🟧	🟧	🟧	🟧	🟧	🟧	🟧
Narodna skupština	🟧	🟥	🟩	🟧	🟧	🟧	🟧
Pravosuđe	🟩	🟧	🟧	🟧	🟧	🟧	🟧
Policija	🟩	🟧	🟩	🟧	🟩	🟧	🟩
Vojska	🟩	🟩	🟩	🟩	🟩	🟩	N/P
Lokalne vlasti	🟧	🟧	🟧	🟥	🟧	🟧	🟩
Političke stranke	🟥	🟥	🟧	🟧	🟧	🟧	🟧

Legenda:

🟥 Veoma nizak nivo poverenja – manje od 20% građana ima poverenja u instituciju

🟧 Nizak nivo poverenja – između 20% i 50% građana ima poverenja u instituciju

🟩 Visok nivo poverenja – više od 50% građana ima poverenja u instituciju

Međutim, ovde je važno naglasiti da treba biti oprezan u pogledu nivoa poverenja u Turskoj zbog nedavnih političkih događaja u vezi sa neuspe-

lim državnim udarom i političkim događajima i procesima koji su posledica državnog udara. Neke nepodudarnosti se mogu konstatovati čak i pre tog događaja, naročito u pogledu nivoa poverenja u pravosuđe. U prethodnoj tabeli i na grafikonu u nastavku teksta prikazani su podaci Evrobarometra (radi uporedivosti sa drugim zemljama), ali valja prikazati i dodatne uvide stečene kroz različita državna istraživanja koji ukazuju na niži nivo poverenja u pravosuđe i nagli pad poverenja u pravosuđe u prethodnoj deceniji. Prema Istraživanju o društveno-političkim tendencijama u Turskoj[15] iz 2011. godine, sudovi su uživali ugled samo kod 38,8% ispitanika, ali se taj procenat smanjio i 2012. godine iznosio 37,2%, a 2014. godine 26,5%. Prema istom istraživanju, 59,7% ispitanika je negativno odgovorilo na pitanje „Da li smatrate da su turski sudovi nezavisni?". Prema ovom istraživanju, procenat ispitanika koji smatraju da su sudovi nezavisni iznosi samo 24,2%. OECD istraživanje[16] ukazuje na promenu tendencija u pogledu poverenja u periodu od 2007. do 2014. godine. Prema ovom istraživanju, poverenje u pravosudni sistem u Turskoj je sa 70% u 2007. godini palo na manje od 50% u 2014. godini. Odnosno, dok je 2007. godine poverenje u pravosudni sistem bilo iznad proseka zemalja OECD-a, 2014. godine je palo ispod proseka (OECD, 2015: 171).

Ovaj grafikon daje detaljniji pregled uvida u nivoe poverenja u zemljama. Tu možemo videti udeo građana koji su izjavili da imaju poverenja u određenu instituciju.

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15 Türkiye Sosyal-Siyasal Eğilimler Araştırması, istraživanje koje svake dve godine sprovodi Kadir Has Univerzitet.

16 OECD *Government at a Glance Report* za 2015. godinu

Grafikon 1: Udeo građana koji imaju poverenja u glavne institucije u zemljama Balkana, Turskoj i EU-28 (prosek), 2015.[17]

Izvor: Evrobarometar za Bugarsku, Tursku, Srbiju i Crnu Goru, istraživanje Analitike za Bosnu i Hercegovinu, i istraživanje Riinvesta za Kosovo.

Na osnovu glavnih tendencija uočenih iz predstavljenih podataka došlo se do nekoliko zaključaka:

- Poverenje u EU institucije među zemljama na Balkanu i u Turskoj je iznad prosečnog nivoa poverenja zabeleženog među građanima 28 država članica EU. Najviši nivo poverenja u EU institucije zabeležen je na Kosovu, a zatim u Bugarskoj. Iako podaci Evrobarometra pokazuju da samo u Bugarskoj i na Kosovu većina građana ima poverenje u EU institucije, to ne treba da se pogrešno shvati kao nizak nivo prihvatanja pristupanja EU. U svim zemljama u regionu, većina građana (odnosno 67% u Turskoj, 65% u Crnoj Gori, 58% u Srbiji) smatra da će njihove zemlje imati koristi od članstva u EU.

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17 Podaci nisu u potpunosti uporedivi zbog toga što potiču iz različitih izvora. Podaci za EU 28, Tursku, Bugarsku, Srbiju i Crnu Goru su u potpunosti uporedivi, i oni su preuzeti iz istraživanja Evrobarometra 2015. Podaci koji se odnose na Bosnu i Hercegovi i Kosovo preuzeti su iz nacionalnih velikih ispitivanja u kojima su se koristili slični instrumenti za prikupljanje podataka o poverenju (Analitika, 2015, Riinvest, 2014). Referentna godina za sve zemlje je 2015, osim za Kosovo, za koje su podaci iz 2014.

- Od svih zemalja koje su bile predmet poređenja, opšti nivo poverenja u institucije, po skoro svim dimenzijama, najniži je u Bugarskoj, osim poverenja u EU institucije.
- U Turskoj je poverenje ravnomernije raspoređeno na različite institucije (s tim što treba biti pažljiv u pogledu pravosuđa, kao što je već prethodno objašnjeno), dok u zemljama na Balkanu postoje jasne težnje da se više poverenja ukazuje određenim institucijama, a da se gaji nepoverenje prema drugim.
- Građani imaju više poverenja u bezbednosne nego u političke institucije. Više veruju policiji nego nacionalnim parlamentima i vladama. Takođe, imaju više poverenja u vojsku nego u policiju.
- Institucije kojima se najmanje veruje su političke stranke, što ozbiljno dovodi u pitanje mehanizme za zastupanje. A to nije samo situacija u Turskoj i zemljama Zapadnog Balkana, već i širom EU.
- Takođe, tendencija da građani više veruju lokalnim ili regionalnim organima nego organima na centralnom/državnom nivou, mada nivoi poverenja nisu visoki (osim u slučaju Kosova), uočljiva je na Kosovu, u Bosni i Hercegovini i Bugarskoj.

Poverenje u institucije je usko povezano sa percepcijom institucionalnih kapaciteta za nepristrasno i efikasno obavljanje uloga predviđenih zakonom u skladu sa zakonom. Vladavina prava se uglavnom shvata kao skup pravnih i političkih mehanizama zasnovanih na povoljnom sastavu osnovnih društvenih interesa. Vladavina prava zahteva da se državnim službenicima i građanima zakonom nametnu obaveze i da se oni ponašaju u skladu sa zakonom. Državni službenici su u dva smisla ograničeni zakonom: prvo, moraju da se ponašaju u skladu sa pozitivnim pravom i mogu da menjaju zakon, ali su te aktivnosti propisane zakonima i široko prihvaćena lista ljudskih prava (Vuković, 2015). Od njih se zahteva da se prilikom preduzimanja aktivnosti konsultuju i ponašaju u skladu sa zakonom, a zakonski propisi predviđaju javno dostupne zahteve i standarde koji se mogu koristiti za pozivanje na odgovornost državnih službenika tokom preduzimanja aktivnosti i nakon toga (Tamanaha, 2009, citirano iz Vukovic, 2015). Rangiranje Svetske banke po indeksu vladavine prava ukazuje na relativni napredak u zemljama u regionu. Indeks odražava percepciju o zastupljenosti poverenja građana u društvo i o zastupljenosti poverenja u poštovanje društvenih pravila, a naročito poverenja u kvalitet izvršenja ugovora, imovinska prava, policiju i sudove, kao i verovatnoću pojave kriminala i nasilja[18].

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18   http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home

Grafikon 2: Rangiranje država prema vladavini prava
(u procentima, na skali od 0 –najmanje do 100-najviše)

Izvor: Svetska banka[19]

U regionu preovlađuje trend percepcije o povećanoj zastupljenosti vladavine prava. Ovo je vidljiv trend u svim zemljama, ali je u nekim, kao što su Srbija i Crna Gora, naročito izražen nakon 2000. godine. Najviši nivo percepcije vladavine prava u 2014. godini zabeležen je u Turskoj i Crnoj Gori, a zatim u Srbiji i Bugarskoj.

Prema podacima Svetske banke, napredak je mnogo skromniji i ponekad kontradiktoran kada se radi o korupciji. Ovaj sistem rangiranja zemalja po suzbijanju korupcije odražava percepcije o zastupljenosti vršenja javnih ovlašćenja radi ostvarenja lične koristi, uključujući sitnu (administrativnu) i krupnu (na visokom nivou) korupciju, kao i „zauzimanje"' države od strane elita i radi zadovoljenja ličnih interesa. Kao što se vidi iz sledećeg grafikona, na najnižoj polaznoj tački se 2000. godine nalazila Srbija, čiji se napredak može oceniti kao prilično brz do 2008. godine. Druge zemlje pokazuju umereniji napredak, dok je u Turskoj zabeležen pad poverenja u institucije između 2008. i 2014. godine. Zanimljivo je da je u Bugarskoj između 2000. i 2008. godine došlo do pada poverenja u institucije, da bi po stupanju u članstvo u EU, nakon 2008. godine, ostalo skoro nepromenjeno.

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19   http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home

Grafikon 3: Rangiranje državama prema suzbijanju korupcije
(u procentima, na skali od 0-najmanje do 100-najviše)

Izvor: Svetska banka[20]

Još jedan važan aspekt konteksta u kome se uspostavlja ili neguje poverenje u institucije, a naročito iz perspektive ljudske bezbednosti, je percepcija političke stabilnosti i odsustvo nasilja i terorizma. Nivo percepcije političke stabilnosti je najviši u Crnoj Gori, nešto je manji u Srbiji i Bugarskoj, značajno niži u Bosni i Hercegovini i na Kosovu, a najniži u Turskoj.

Grafikon 4: Rangiranje prema političkoj stabilnosti i
odsustvu nasilja i terorizma

Izvor: Svetska banka[21]

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20   http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home
21   http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home

Ne postoji nedvosmisleni dokaz o direktnoj korelaciji između nivoa poverenja i nivoa razvijenosti demokratije. Takođe, istraživanja pokazuju da u nedemokratskom institucionalnom okviru, u društvima u kojima su neformalni odnosi i klijentelistička praksa široko rasprostranjeni, ne može postojati značajan stepen poverenja. Razlika je u tome što je poverenje više vezano za neformalne nego za formalne institucije (Torsello, 2012). Sa druge strane, poverenje u javne institucije je veće u najrazvijenijim demokratskim društvima. Prema indeksu demokratije[22], Bugarska, Srbija i Crna Gora su rangirane kao manjkave demokratije, dok su Bosna i Hercegovina i Turska klasifikovane kao hibridni režimi (podaci za Kosovo nisu bili dostupni).

Tabela 2: Rangiranje prema indeksu demokratije

Indeks demokratije							
Podaci	Ocena	Izborni procesi i pluralizam	Funkcionisanje administracije	Učešće u političkom životu	Politička kultura	Građanske slobode	Kategorija
Švedska	9.45	9.58	9.64	8.33	10.00	9.71	Potpuna demokratija
Bugarska	7.14	9.17	6.07	7.22	5.00	8.24	Manjkava demokratija
Srbija	6.71	9.17	5.36	6.67	5.00	7.35	Manjkava demokratija
Crna Gora	6.01	7.92	5.71	5.00	4.38	7.06	Manjkava demokratija
Bosna i Hercegovina	4.83	6.50	2.93	3.89	4.38	6.47	Hibridni režim
Turska	5.12	6.67	5.36	5.00	5.63	2.94	Hibridni režim

Izvor: Economist Intelligence Unit, Indeks demokratije za 2015.

Determinante niskog nivoa poverenja u javne institucije u regionu

Zašto ljudi ne veruju da savremene institucije u njihovim društvima obavljaju efikasnu ulogu u ime građana, doprinoseći bezbednosti okruženja? Na ovo pitanje nije lako odgovoriti, ali su u ovoj oblasti sprovedena mnoga

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22 Indeks demokratije meri stanje demokratije u 167 zemalja. Zasnovan je na oko 60 pokazatelja grupisanih u pet različitih kategorija kojima se meri pluralizam, građanske slobode, i politička kultura. Prema ovom indeksu, demokratije se klasifikuju u četiri grupe: potpune demokratije, demokratije sa nedostatkom (manjkave demokratije), hibridni režimi i autoritativni režimi.

istraživanja koja ukazuju na određeno istorijsko nasleđe i savremene faktore.

Poverenje građana u vladu zasnovano je na širokom spektru ekonomskih, društvenih i političkih interakcija između građana i vlade. Literatura najčešće identifikuje četiri grupe faktora sa dominantnim uticajem: kultura, institucionalno okruženje, ekonomski i društveni faktori, i rad institucija. Neki istraživači su utvrdili da postoje dve glavne determinante poverenja u institucije: percepcija slobode i pravednosti i procena ekonomskog učinka (Mishler, Rose, 1997).

Druga literarna struja ukazuje na dublje ukorenjene determinante povezane sa međusobnim odnosima formalnih i neformalnih institucija i prakse. Kao što su neki autori primetili, upravljanje se uvek dešava „negde između formalnosti i neformalnosti" (Hayoz, 2013: 52). U ovom delu sveta, u regionu Balkana i u Turskoj, formalne i neformalne institucije su u praksi čvrsto povezane; a formalne institucije su često ukorenjene u neformalnim mrežama i praksi. U takvom kontekstu, važni faktori niskog poverenja u javne institucije mogu se naći u široko rasprostranjenim i jakim neformalnim mrežama i praksama zasnovanim na klijentelizmu i političkom pokroviteljstvu (koji sprečavaju institucije da u radu budu nepristrasne, neutralne i usmerene na građane); često i ponekad sistemski uključuju korupciju, nedostatak građanskih struktura i kulturu reformskih procesa koji su više vođeni eksternim nego unutrašnjim faktorima, gde je pristupanje EU uslovljeno efikasnošću i odsustvom unutrašnjih slabosti. Važno je da bliže sagledamo ove faktore, pošto sve buduće aktivnosti usmerene na unapređenje dobre uprave i vladavine prava u regionu moraju da ih uzmu u obzir.

Istorijska nasleđa obeležena su zakasnelim i nepotpunim procesima modernizacije, slabom ulogom države koju je zarobila elita, sećanjima na komunističke/socijalističke ili druge autoritativne režime koji koriste institucije za reprodukciju elite, sistema ili za ostvarivanje trenutne koristi pripadnika krugova/ mreža moćnika. Kao što su naglasili neki istraživači, neformalnost je važna karakteristika postsocijalističkih društava, i institucije su tokom tranzicije izgrađene ne „na ruševinama komunizma", već „od ostataka komunizma" (Stark, 1996: 995); što znači da su neformalne mreže moćnika nastavile da igraju ključnu ulogu u stvaranju i održavanju tih institucija. Uzroci slabog institucionalnog učinka su brojni. Nakon pada socijalizma, država se povukla brže nego što su se mogli doneti i sprovesti zakonski propisi kojima bi se uredila kontrola tržišnih aktivnosti. Zakonske propise su često podrivali državni akteri zainteresovani za „otimanje" državnih resursa zarad sopstvenih interesa ili urušavanja državnih institucija iznutra (Sik, 1994). Naročito razorne posledice su primećene u zemljama bivše Jugoslavije u kojima je došlo do potpunog uništenja institucionalnog okvira za vreme ratova za otcepljenje (Bolčić, 1994, Lazić, 1994). Nakon sukoba, morale su se izgraditi nove institucije zasnovane na tom nasleđu, ali i na novim, izrazito etičkim

strukturama; kao rezultat, novonastale države u regionu su oblikovane po određenim verzijama političkog kapitalizma u kojem privredu i političke institucije u najvećoj meri (često neformalno) uređuju političke elite (Antonić, 1993, 2006, Arandarenko, 2000, Lazić and Pešić, 2012, Cvejić, 2016).

U čuvenom istraživanju o tome zašto nacije propadaju, Acemoglu i Robinson (2012) su političke institucije kategorisali kao inkluzivne (razvojne) i ekstraktivne (pljačkaške). Inkluzivne institucije omogućavaju prosperitet, ekonomski razvoj i održive demokratske institucije. S druge strane, ekstraktivne institucije su stvorene radi zadovoljenja interesa političkih elita, a ne opšte populacije, i imaju negativan uticaj na razvoj inkluzivnih ekonomskih institucija i društva u celini. U nedostatku ekonomskog razvoja, povećanja životnog standarda i kvaliteta života građana, veća je verovatnoća da će građani upravljačke institucije češće percipirati kao pljačkaške nego kao inkluzivne; naročito, kada je korupcija široko rasprostranjena i kada nije sankcionisana, što je slučaj u zemljama Zapadnog Balkana. U stvari, istraživači su utvrdili da poverenje u javne institucije u velikoj meri zavisi od percepcije korupcije. Što je percepcija o zastupljenosti korupcije raširenija, veće je nepoverenje u političke i pravne institucije (Wallace i Latcheva, 2006). Među zemljama sa uspešnijom tranzicijom primećen je trend pozitivne spirale povećanja formalizacije, poverenja i percepcije opadanja zastupljenosti korupcije, dok je među zemljama sa manje uspešnom tranzicijom, primećen trend negativne spirale sve veće neformalnosti, percepcije povećanja zastupljenosti korupcije i gubitka poverenja u institucije (Wallace i Latcheva, 2006).

Pored ovog problema, postoje još složenije poteškoće u vezi sa izgradnjom države, što je slučaj u Bosni i Hercegovini, gde je usled ustavnog uređenja zemlje državna uprava regulisana na više nivoa vlasti (državni, entitetski i kantonalni). Ovo, zajedno sa odsustvom formalno garantovanog sistema subordinacije smanjuje harmonizaciju i osnažuje konkurenciju za neformalna ovlašćenja između kreatora politike na različitim nivoima uprave. Pored toga, velika politička konkurencija sprečava političke elite da se pozabave dubljom reformom državne uprave pošto će to značiti smanjenje zaposlenosti u javnom sektoru, sve veće nezadovoljstvo birača, i podrivanje strukturnih temelja njihove moći. Proces negativne selekcije na bazi klijentelizma, i nepotizma smanjuje ljudske resurse potrebne za reforme. Stoga, nije iznenađujuće da građani navode nedostatak bilo kakvog napretka (40% ispitanika) ili veoma skroman napredak (31%) u ovoj oblasti reformi (Transparency International, 2014).

Kada ne postoji poverenje u institucije, veća je verovatnoća da će se građani više oslanjati na neformalne mreže. Dokazi iz raznih istraživanja u regionu pokazuju da se mnogo veći broj građana u post-socijalističkim zemljama oslanja na neformalni društveni kapital i mreže, kao što su prijatelji, članovi porodice, i poznanici, nego ljudi u razvijenim kapitalističkim zemljama (Rose, 1997, Grodeland, 2007, Aliyev, 2015). Međutim, još jedan oblik

društvenih mreža i kapitala ključan je za unapređenje upravljanja, stvaranje pouzdanih institucija i napredne društvene odgovornosti – organizovano i aktivno civilno društvo. Civilno društvo obuhvata organizacije, društvene pokrete, neformalne grupe, neposredno učešće građana u javnom i politič-kom životu, kao i u demokratsku javnu sferu. Energično civilno društvo je neophodno za jačanje dobre uprave, vladavine prava i demokratije (Vuković, 2015).

Prema tome, pitanje izgradnje poverenja u institucije nije samo pita-nje jednostrane institucionalne reforme, naročito spolja vođene uslovljava-njem od strane EU, već je to i pitanje stvaranja struktura koje će omogućiti izgradnju institucija i rad institucija u društveno odgovornom okruženju, u kojoj civilno društvo ima veliku ulogu.

Country Specific Case Studies

Jasmin Jasarevic

Bosnia and Herzegovina: Human Security Aspect of Youth Living in 'Collective Centers' or 'Alternative Accommodation Centers'

The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1990s resulted in an estimated 1.2 million people fleeing the country's borders and over a million people being rendered internally displaced. Today, two decades after the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, over 100,000 people remain internally displaced, including some 8,600 especially vulnerable persons living in approximately 159 centers throughout the country. The enduring presence of these centers for the internally displaced – referred to within Bosnia and Herzegovina as either 'collective centers' or 'alternative accommodation centers' – poses a challenging set of issues that can be subject of this research: How many young people live in those centers? What are the living conditions in internal displacement for young people? What efforts can be undertaken to assure Human safety to the internally displaced youth in centers? When does internal displacement end and what are the "next steps" for young people?

Research objectives and methods

Research was focused on people living in centers that were purposely created for displaced persons immediately after the war in BiH, in both entities and Brcko District.

Primary questions:

- What are the dangers facing young people in the "collective centers" or "alternative accommodation centers" in BiH?
- What are the dangers facing young people after they leave the "collective centers" or "alternative accommodation centers" in BiH?

Secondary questions:

- What kinds of protection/remedies are available to youth living in centers?
- What is the role of relevant authorities in resolving the issues young people are facing in centers?

- Are Human security issues in the centers increased through lack of laws or their poor implementation?
- How are the living conditions in centers affecting equality and social inclusion of young people living there?

The research was conducted through qualitative methods of study in three cities in Bosnia: Tuzla, Bratunac, and Brcko district BiH. The qualitative method included literature research, evidencing available studies and data on the topic and existing legal and sub-legal acts that deal with the issue of internal displaced persons (IDPs), focus groups discussions (FGD) and interviews. Primary target group for focus group discussions were youth that are living in collective centers and their parents, whereas in-depth interviews were conducted with key informants – school directors, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) representatives, municipal and governmental representatives.

Relevant context

According the Report of BiH state Ministry for human rights and refugees report from 2005 there was total of 7311 people living in Collective centers in BiH, out of that 61,1% in Centers located in FBiH and 38,9% in Centers located in RS[23].

Table 3: Number and percentage of residents of collective forms of accommodation in BiH in 2005

Place of accommodation	Federation of BiH	Republika Srpska	Total
Families	1.677	863	2.540
Persons	4.467	2.844	7.311
% (families/housing units)	61.1	38.9	100

Source: Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees of BiH, 2005

Structure of residents of collective centers – per number of family members. The largest numbers of collective centers' residents are two-member families, then three-member families, and immediately thereafter singles.

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23   This report doesn't include data from Brcko district BiH.

Table 4: Structure of residents of collective centers –
per number of family members

Number of members	Federation of BiH		Republika Srpska		Total	
	Families	Persons	Families	Persons	Families	Persons
1	503	503	34	34	537	537
2	373	746	282	564	655	1.310
3	304	912	251	753	555	1.665
4	289	1.156	123	492	412	1.648
5	136	680	83	415	219	1.095
6	49	294	57	342	106	636
7	13	91	23	161	36	252
8	5	40	7	56	12	96
9	5	45	3	27	8	72
Total	1.677	4.467	863	2.844	2.540	7.311
Average per family	2.7		3.3		2.9	

Source: Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees of BiH, 2005

As it is clear from the Table below, the highest percentage of persons living in Centers in BiH are Bosniaks; the number of Serbs is nearly half of that; the number of Croats accommodated in the collective centers is less than 5%.

Table 5: Ethnic structure of residents of collective accommodation in BiH

Entity	Bosniaks		Croats		Serbs		Total	
F BiH	1.560	4.203	113	257	4	7	1.677	4.467
RS					863	2.844	863	2.844
% (families/ housing units)	61.4		4.4		34.1		100	

Source: Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees of BiH, 2005

As for their Entity distribution, it is obvious that 100% of the residents of collective accommodation in the RS are Serbs, and in the F BiH are Bosniaks and Croats.

In the Ministry's report, some particularly vulnerable groups are identified among population accommodated in collective centers: persons with mental problems, persons with disabilities, persons incapable of independent life, persons in need of social assistance. In the report is noted that their return cannot be ensured through reconstruction of their pre-war homes (if they had one at all). Young people accommodated in collective centers are not recognized by vulnerable group in the Ministry's report.

According to more recent data obtained by the research of Union for sustainable return and integrations (the biggest NGO in this field in BiH), there were 1830 families or 7223 people are still living in Centers in 2011[24].

There are 455 displaced people living in Collective Centers in Brcko district according the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center. According the report of elementary school in Prutace there are 90 displaced children attending this school.

Key findings

Different forms and types of human security challenges were identified during this research among displaced youth living in Collective Centres. After the initial discussions with participants in focus group discussions, they all tend to easily understand Human security concept. During discussion, they reported various forms of human security hazards they were facing either during their life in collective center or upon relocation. These hazards include: psychological violence, insecurities due to the infrastructural challenges, environmental hazards, poor economic situation, social inequalities, religious based violence, sexual violence, physical attacks, gender based and cultural forms of violence.

The three most common forms of insecurities they emphasized are related to bad insecure livelihoods due to the low economic participation and generally unfavorable economic situation, lack of protection and access to relevant protective institutions and cultural gap between them (people living in collective centers) and people from surrounding local communities. Those human security challenges prevail over other forms as it appeared in discussions in all three cities.

Young people developed number of coping strategies to mitigate these security challenges. Main difference is in personal coping strategy and possibility/will to involve different institutions in resolving the security threats. The most dominant personal coping strategy among youth is avoid-

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24   This report doesn't include data from Brcko district BiH as well.

ing conflicts, stay in home, walk in groups, behave that they are not from collective center, and finally to face the problems trough active engagement. In case of physical insecurity, young people from collective centers would address firstly family and friends, and less police, centers for social work and schools.

Although most of the participants in focus groups discussion claimed that they do not trust institutions such as police, center for social work or other governmental bodies or public institutions. However, in case of physical threats, they are ready to address police. Young people and their parents believe that police could do much more in terms of improving human security aspects in collective centers.

Centers for social work are seen as actor with 'double role'. On one hand, they are estimated as helpful as they provide regular financial assistance to the displaced families, while on the other hand, they are perceived as source of problems as they decide to accommodate together with displaced persons former convicts, other families in social need such as Roma, poor, transforming collective centers into shelters for diverse groups in social assistance needs.

Young people and their parents were very positive about the role of schools and they were thankful for the opportunity to attend primary school which was in the vicinity of collective center.

NGOs are mainly not present and their work is seen as important in providing additional education and possibilities for young people to travel, meet other young people and socialize with their peers. Youth NGOs are mainly the ones whit which young people were in touch but also they have cultural and sport association in which they can socialize and have joint activities. For them is also important support coming from different international organizations and Diaspora.

Participant's opinion on possible changes and perspective for future are slightly different across the different groups. This depends on current situation, some people are still living in centers while some people are not living in centers anymore so their proposals for future are different. For young people and their parents that are living in centers the perspective lives in continuation of school and moving to some other cities. For people that lived in centers they have facing real life situations like paying rent, electricity bills, etc. And for them future perspectives are still closely related to their past life in centers. The reality and surrounding environment, in terms of socio-economic and political situation, is not favorable and they have been living on margins for last 20 years. Somehow it looks like that leaving the organized life in centers, no matter how difficult that may have been, makes new problems for people after people have been moved.

For young people living in centers some practical activities have been recognized as priorities like setting up police station or permanent patrol in centers (Tuzla and Brcko), improve implementation of laws and regulations (speed limits signs in Tuzla and environmental police for wild dumps in Brcko), opening of community/youth center where the can have possibility to spent their free time (Tuzla and Brcko) and for both of those centers they believe that some sort of control of people that are coming to their center should take place as well as some sort of security camera surveillance.

In Bratunac most of the priorities related to resolving security issues lies in economic empowerment of young people and their families as well as continuation of school and integration in local society trough some sort of youth activism and engagement.

From perspective of other stakeholders they all recognized the difficult situation for young people living in collective centers, they see the need of more active involvements of other institutions in resolving the security challenges in collective centers and propose that more cross-sectorial cooperation with other relevant institutions responsible for Human security, are needed.

Stakeholders recognized that following interventions can improve human security and social inclusion of young people living in collective centers:

- Opening or new reconstruction of existing facilities that would be used for working with young people in their free time
- Ask the relevant authorities, especially Ministry for human rights and refugees BiH, to involve more BiH NGOs in programs implemented by this ministry
- Increase the cooperation with police and other institutions with young people through the establishment of clear mechanisms for communication and cooperation
- More active involvement of local NGOs with youth from collective centers

Conclusions

Youth in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in general, suffers from lack of employment, poor education system, lack of opportunities and recognition. These problems are even more prominent among displaced youth living in Collective Centers. As Fridrih Erbert Stiftug research from 2015 concludes: "On the whole, it is estimated that every second person in Bosnia and Herzegovina was displaced, either internally displaced, or forced into exile abroad. Many households were decimated, or even totally destroyed. Family members became invalids, and numerous households were torn by their

members moving out to third countries. Especially alarming is present discouragement from entering into marriage, and, particularly, from childbearing. "Erosion" of certain essential functions of the family is evident, such as socialization function, education and economic function, as well as protection, emotional support and identification. It should also be emphasized that present-day BiH society is still not ready to take over the "family role in caring", including the aspect of socialization of individuals, that is, shaping personality values, as well as taking over economic and social child care. In such a way, a 'gap' has been formed, to be filled by some other entity, such as street, peers, media, including different types of internet content, infrequently exerting fatal influence over development of mental characteristics of youth' (FES, 2015).

No youth program was ever initiated or implemented for youth population living in Centers by any of the governmental programs and only few programs for youth from Centers were implemented by local and international NGOs. Youth from Centers were not part of any youth policy or strategy in entity or District level and not even part of "Revised strategy of Bosnia and Herzegovina For the Implementation of Annex VII of the Dayton Peace Agreement 2009/2014".

Since there is a hope, such is the newly established 'Joint Regional Programme on Durable Solutions for Refugees and Displaced Persons" known as the 'Regional Housing Programme' (RHP) is a joint initiative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro and Serbia. The aim of this regional initiative, which is an integral part of the "Sarajevo Process on refugees and displaced persons" initiated in 2005, re-launched in March 2010 at the Belgrade conference, and to which the Partner Countries have re-committed themselves with the November 2011 Belgrade Declaration, is to contribute towards resolving the protracted displacement situation of the most vulnerable refugees and displaced persons (DPs) following the 1991–1995 conflicts on the territory of former Yugoslavia, including internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Montenegro from 1999, by, inter alia, providing them with durable housing solutions.

Recommendations based on the case study

- Increase the police force presence and police activities in collective centers
- Better implementation of existing policies and procedures
- Opening spaces for youth activism in collective centers
- Increase the control of people that are placed in collective centers by relevant authorities
- Sting up surveillance cameras in collective centers

- Working on youth economic empowerment in collective centers
- Better and increased cross-sectoral cooperation
- More active involvement of local NGOs in Ministry for civil affairs BiH programs
- Establishing cooperation and communication mechanism with NGOs

Stoycho Stoychev

Bulgaria: Trust in the Bulgarian Police – Implications for Human Security

Relevant Context

In recent years, Bulgaria has witnessed a significant drop of public trust in institutions. Survey data show sustainably low levels of approval, while the levels of disapproval constantly increase at the expense of those who are indifferent.[25] While trust in political institutions of the representative democracy is expectedly low, its falling levels in the law-enforcement agencies, and the police in particular, show increasing human insecurity stemming from the flawed rule-of-law.

Chart 5: Work of the police: public assessment 2000 – 20016, %[26]

Source: Alpha Research (http://alpharesearch.bg/). The data are provided in machine-readable format upon personal request.

Low levels of trust indicate that public institutions are not recognized as regulators of public interest, therefore they maintain private and illicit welfares. Out of thirty countries in the ESS6 dataset, the trust in legislature, the legal system and in politicians is lower only in Ukraine and the average is about two times higher than the score for Bulgaria. Except for Ukraine, police is less trusted in Russia, but trust in political parties is lowest in Bulgaria.

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25 Publicly available time series are provided by the Alpha Research polling agency (http://alpharesearch.bg).

26 Since December 2008 the agency substituted the "Cannot say" option with "Neither positive, nor negative", which is the reason for the drastic increase of the levels of that category.

Table 6: Trust in major Bulgarian institutions, 2013

	Parliament	Legal system	Police	Politicians	Political parties	European Parliament	United Nations
No trust at all	38.5%	35.1%	22.8%	40.9%	38.6%	18.2%	16.9%
1	12.1%	13.3%	8.1%	14.1%	14.6%	6.4%	7.1%
2	12.6%	13.6%	10.2%	14.4%	14.7%	6.9%	6.0%
3	11.0%	11.7%	11.2%	12.1%	13.2%	8.2%	6.8%
4	9.2%	7.7%	12.0%	7.5%	8.0%	9.3%	7.7%
5	9.3%	8.9%	13.3%	7.0%	6.9%	19.7%	17.3%
6	2.7%	3.1%	5.9%	1.7%	1.5%	9.1%	8.7%
7	1.7%	2.0%	4.8%	1.0%	0.9%	8.3%	9.9%
8	1.5%	2.2%	4.6%	0.5%	0.8%	6.2%	8.1%
9	0.5%	0.8%	2.6%	0.3%	0.3%	3.0%	4.5%
Complete trust	0.8%	1.6%	4.6%	0.5%	0.6%	4.8%	7.1%
Av. Score	2.1	2.2	3.5	1.7	1.8	4.2	4.5

Source: The European Social Survey, Sixth Wave (www.europeansocialsurvey.org)

The decline in trust in the police, which now join the judiciary and the political parties at the bottom of public support signifies deterioration of the problem and replacement of public institutions with informal regulations in everyday life, which in turn increases uncertainty and insecurity at the individual level. The police is a key institution in providing personal security to the individual citizens. Unreformed and corrupted police is a major factor for high levels of conventional crime that affects everyday life of the individuals.

Research objective and methodology

In this chapter we use a set of twelve semi-structured interviews with experts, to reveal the factors of low public trust in the police and its implications for the human security in the country. The topics covered are:

- What are the reasons for the recent tendency of decline in public trust in the police;
- What actions does the police take to regain trust, and do these vary across different governments;

- Is the ongoing reform attempt capable of regaining public trust;
- How citizens substitute police when their human security is being threatened;
- Human security in which social groups is most dependent on the police;
- Which is the greatest threat to human security that can be resolved by the police?

The interviews were conducted in April and May 2015.[27]

Main Findings on Trust in Police

Given that freedom of movement of people and goods in the European Union and Schengen space is extremely easy, European countries are more or less homogenous compared to the rest of the world regarding crime levels. Therefore, we can expect that if differences in crime reporting exist, these can largely be attributed to the level of public trust in law-enforcement agencies, and the level of institutionalization of law enforcement community outreach. In other words, if there are fewer reported crimes in a country relative to others, this would suggest that people do not rely on the police because they do not perceive the police as a trusted institution for handling such problems (Azfar and Murrell 2009; Hunt 2006; Soares 2004a; Soares 2004b). Hence, lower levels of reported crime indicate higher levels of corruption, and can be used as a measure of political risk (Stoychev 2013). Here we do not examine the Bulgarian case in comparative perspective, but rather focus on the temporal dynamics of several types of crimes.

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27   Here we should express our gratitude to Martin Balkanski whose valuable support in the research work made the study possible.

Table 7: Recorded criminal offences per hundred thousand inhabitants, 2008 – 2013

Offence category	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	Rank 2013
Burglary	265.76	317.15	323.44	275.08	229.02	235.61	5/34
Burglary of private residential premises	89.72	106.64	112.35	88.99	88.11	87.80	5/35
Rape	3.48	3.29	2.84	2.13	2.55	2.25	7/35
Sexual violence	9.96	9.72	9.38	8.81	9.36	8.68	8/33
Sexual assault	6.48	6.43	6.53	6.68	6.81	6.42	8/34
Attempted intentional homicide	0.80	0.88	0.85	0.83	0.61	0.93	10/32
Unlawful acts involving controlled drugs or precursors	38.00	49.04	50.73	38.80	40.40	41.90	10/35
Theft	504.56	533.11	680.15	642.15	606.81	621.53	10/37
Theft of a motorized land vehicle	61.45	59.86	53.06	43.88	42.06	49.19	11/37
Assault	42.78	41.81	40.93	33.41	32.89	33.91	12/37
Robbery	38.15	48.16	50.35	42.20	40.33	40.87	17/37
Kidnapping	1.69	1.90	1.59	1.04	1.02	1.19	19/32
Intentional homicide	2.29	2.01	1.98	1.74	1.92	1.48	28/37

Source: Eurostat (data extracted on 28/09/2015)

The table shows that according to police statistics Bulgaria scores very well in light crime rates, but things worsen when it comes to heavier crimes like intentional homicides, kidnappings and robberies. Actually, if we take all the countries, Bulgaria makes no exception from the rest Southeast European states and just opposite to the Northwestern part of the continent. If we interpret these data in the way institutions present it, it turns out that Denmark and Sweden for instance have much bigger problem with conventional crime than Bulgaria and Romania. The key to the riddle is in systemic corruption. In corrupted societies people do not trust the police and settle their relations in private through informal institutions and regulations. The police also discourage the few that are eager to report burglaries or sexual violence in order to keep police statistics clean and tidy. However, when it

comes to heavy crimes like homicides or crimes that have to be registered in order because of insurance like thefts of vehicles there are not many options. Thus, drop in registration of lighter offences like burglaries could serve as an indicator for distrust in the police and higher levels of human insecurity.

The table shows an increase of such registrations in 2009 and 2010 when the newly formed Borisov government took some serious actions against crime. Paradoxically, the more visible the governmental efforts against crime, the higher the reported crime rates. Therefore, there was a momentum for change, which obviously has gone since the reported levels of these crimes have dropped again.

In this section we summarize the key statements of the interviewed experts under each of the proposed topics. A special emphasis is made wherever a dissonance in the opinions exists.

What are the factors for low trust in the Bulgarian Police?

The inability of institutions to effectively enforce sanctions, slow in-vestigations and low number of uncovered conventional crimes are the main factors of public distrust in law-enforcing agencies. The reasons for low effectiveness are the frequent normative reforms in the security sec-tors and the political interference in the work of the law-enforcing agencies, which distort the system. The negative effects on public trust are backed by the inability of the police to communicate successful stories.

All the respondents agree that here is a decline in trust in the police. The most critical period was between 2001 and 2009 when the rates of heavy crimes were high. The first Borisov government managed to break the biggest organized criminal groups and put the police in the focus of public attention. The trust was high for some time and the negative trend was reversed between 2009 and 2012. Then the impetus was lost and, the public image of the police suffered some huge scandals and again the trust began to drop. The parallel growth of crime levels has a substantial impact on human security. The perceptions of the ordinary people regarding crime as a serious risk become more alarming after 2013, which according to one of the interviewees, is a direct consequence of public disclosure of cases, where policemen or other representatives of the system are accused of criminal activities.

Another factor for the general distrust comes from the perceived misbalance between the service provided by the police and the price that society pays or it. On the one hand the number of employees is very high, on the other there are areas of the country with high levels of crime largely unprotected by the police.

One of the experts suggests that trust in the police is a matter of PR. If there are publicly communicated operations of the police and arrests broadcasted by the media, the trust rises. The trust goes down when media report crimes, show elderly people who were robbed, or protests of police officers. Then number of reported crimes also falls. The main reason for not reporting is that people are convinced that "there is no point". Seeking better performance results on paper, some police officers discourage people to register crimes, as well and that is how they keep good crime statistics.

What actions do the police take to regain trust, and do these vary across different governments?

According to part of the respondents, until late 2015 the measures taken by the police in order to regain public confidence were limited to demonstrative operations with mainly PR usage and effect. The present political leadership tries to modernize the police through far-reaching reforms, which have the potential to raise public trust. The reforms include strengthening of the internal security department in order to curb corruption within the system.

Is the ongoing reform capable of bringing back public trust?

In the last year, the Ministry of interior initiated a structural reform in the security sector in general. The declared purposes of the set of policy measures was targeted at reducing administrative personnel, optimizing structure and strengthening of the operational forces by better organization and equipment. The expected results were to reduce the cost of the service provided by the system, while significantly increasing the level crime prevention and human security (provided that the government declared much higher levels of national security).

The experts split, when asked if the reform would increase public confidence in the police. Part of them sees a potential for success, only if the reform is result-oriented. The levels of conventional crime, for instance, are perceived as very high and growing. In experts' views a positive shift will be possible only when people see a specific result in the fight against it. Prioritizing conventional crime to organized and heavy crime is a sign of reorientation of the police towards enhanced human security.

One of the respondents explicitly states that the reform could increase public trust "only if people receive better security service" and directly connects trust with the problem of conventional crime as a threat to human security. People would trust the police more if they feel safer in personal plan.

However, a part of the experts are rather skeptical of the outcome of the reform. Their argument rests on the track record of unsuccessful reform efforts of previous political cabinets. Even if the reform achieves some level of optimization, the attitude towards the police would not change much, since it is the result of a complex set of other attitudes.

How citizens substitute police when their human security is being threatened and they see no support in institutions?

What people usually do, especially in the rural areas with low number of police officers, to protect themselves from robberies is to organize voluntary patrols or hire private security companies. The efficacy of these measures varies. In some villages the model works well, but in others does not, especially when it comes to voluntary patrols.

One of the experts defines private security companies as the mostly used solution. In his view, these companies are phenomenally wide spread in Bulgaria in comparison to other countries. These companies, he says, collectively are the biggest employer in the country. At the same time it remains largely in the shadow economy.

Another expert argued that migration is also used as a tool for personal safety. People abandon villages with high risk and move to larger towns and cities, where the levels of conventional crime if not lower, are at least not so visible.

All experts are unanimous that these measures do not provide sustainable results. Private security companies are not always effective and cost money, which means people pay twice to receive security. Voluntary patrols are even less effective and sometimes are prerequisite for taking the law into one's own hands. Migration leads to ghettoization of new areas. Therefore, the answer is in better institutions and effective crime prevention.

Human security in which social groups is most dependent on the police?

People with low income and low level of education are most vulnerable in general. In the rural areas elderly people often become victims of crimes, as well. These two groups are explicitly victimized. They do not have other means to protect their human security, but to rely on the police. Therefore, ineffective institutions affect these people most. In larger cities people on average do not become victims of crime so frequent. Private security solutions work better and the dependence on the police as a security provider is lower.

A systemic problem occurs in ghettoes with compact Roma population. State institutions are practically absent from these settlements and police is replaced by informal networks and regulations in providing human

security. This is even more problematic because it is a prerequisite for the emergence of mafia-like communities and dependencies that endanger human security of their members in even greater extent.

However, a part of the experts believe that the whole society depends on the police in equal extent. "Not a single social group is adequately protected. Neither are the rich, nor the poor, the elderly people, the inhabitants of the cities, the peasants or the tourists. Nobody is protected. In Bulgaria crime is widespread and spontaneously generated because it remains unpunished."

Which is the greatest threat to human security that can be resolved by the police?

Experts are unanimous that the greatest threat to human security in Bulgaria is conventional crime and the police is the institution that has to fight with it. In rural areas where the police is not present, people are in constant risk and generally very unsafe.

Part of the experts stress on the systemic dimensions of the problem. The general lack of rule of law, ineffective public institutions, the general spread of corruption and lack of adequate law enforcement create a risky environment where all citizens are personally endangered.

Key Conclusions

To sum up, the distrust in the police signifies a generally low level of human security in the country. The greatest threats are crimes against the personality and the property of the citizens. These crimes are more frequent in areas with low presence of the police, which implies that there is a necessity of reform that will provide better prevention and better counteraction to crime. The ongoing reform efforts in the sector may provide a solution, but the results are still not undisputed.

Solutions at the personal or community level are not sustainable and in some cases even worsen the situation. Replacement of public institutions with informal networks leads to a vicious circle of distrust and insecurity that becomes harder to be broken.

Of course, the problem is not isolated and could not be adequately considered separately from the general institutional framework. The high levels of corruption, the poor law enforcement and substitution of formal with informal regulations deteriorate human security and boosts risk. The resulting poor social conditions and low economic performance contribute to other risk factors or the general state of insecurity.

Recommendations based on the case study

The situation could be improved in two main ways:

- The police should develop more efficient methods for communication. The proper broadcast of good practices and specific result will definitely lead to more trust and consequently to better cooperation between citizens and institutions. This will create prerequisites for better performance of the police.
- On the other hand, better prevention and better organization of the police work could be achieved through successful reform. It has to provide better use of the limited resources and more effective counteraction and prevention.
- Conventional crime in rural areas could be curbed by better organization of the gendarmerie according to the French model.

Besa Kabasi
Yllka Buzhala

Kosovo: Contending Trust in Financial Institutions

The banking industry holds a dominant position within the financial system, especially in regard to lending activities for businesses and in regard to people's economic life. The banking industry in Kosovo and its current strong risk adverse policies, especially in terms of conditions and services to clients (Kosovo citizens), fosters lack of trust amongst its consumers, shifting consumer behaviour, and in doing so affecting economic security. This in return fosters tremendous uncertainties amongst Kosovars, in terms of economic security, health security, and food security, among other forms of human security. This industry, while it could become an element that actually fuels development and prosperity (with benefits even to them), it is currently following policies that are actually making economic development in the country quite stagnant. This is directly linked to the wellbeing of people who live in Kosovo, most of which are clients of two major banks, and who experience dissatisfaction with what they are being offered, compared to the countries of the Region, and beyond, fostering distrust in banks. The lack of trust in financial institutions hinders consumer behaviour, therefore hindering the market and the economy as a whole, which in turn will then in a cyclical process affect the economic security of the population.

Research objectives and methodology

The aim of this case study is to explore the phenomenon of public trust in financial institutions, and its effects on the human security of the Kosovo citizens. With the assumption that lack of trust in financial institutions, in Kosovo's case, banks, distorts consumer behaviour (including businesses) negatively effecting the economy as a whole, which then adversely affects the human security of the population, the research will focus on trust in the banking industry in particular and its effects on the economic security.

After careful review of the literature, which allowed for a clear presentation of the background and the current situation surrounding public trust in banks in Kosovo and beyond, it was decided to use case studies in order to get an initial assessment and better understanding on the issue of trust in banks.

The main research question was to explore what is the rationale behind people's trust or distrust in banks in Kosovo and how these are related to the issue of their human security, specifically economic security. The research was small-scale qualitative research/case study, based on six cases chosen based on their diversity as well as their common denomina-

tors (bank client status) selected in order to draw out detailed information regarding the issues of trust in banks and its links to economic security.[28] Semi structured in depth interviews were conducted with selected respondents, focusing on the main areas of our study which are: financial literacy/awareness, economic security and their perception of banks (level of trust and reasons of trust or lack thereof in Kosovo banks).

Relevant Context

In general, the financial system is perceived as the main actor in economic growth. While other countries such as the United Kingdom or the United States of America inject money into the economy via their stock markets and banking sector, Kosovo considers the banking industry as the only source to finance a large part of the private consumption and the business investment. This is considered a limitation, and therefore it is highly important to ensure competition in the banking industry, so all the recourses (mainly deposits within banks' balance sheets) are utilized efficiently.

According to Aliu (2015) "within the structure of the Kosovo financial system, in 2014, banks participated with 70.1% followed by the pension fund with 24.1%, and insurance companies with 3.1% etc. The level of concentration in the banking industry has shown signs of declining since 2011 in terms of: assets, loans and deposits. Total assets in the financial system in 2014 were 4.5 billion Euros; assets in the banking system, 3.2 billion where loans participated with 1.9 billion and deposits with 2.5 billion. In 2013 the deposits were in the range of 2.2 billion Euros while lending 1.8 billion Euros, reserves in the central bank were 209 million Euros and 391 million Euros were sleeping in the banking system. In 2014, the deposits that were not utilized within the banking industry were in the range of 376 million Euros, which shows over liquidity in the system. Lowering the criteria for more banks to get into the industry would enable that 391 million Euros to be utilized more efficiently as the key generator of innovation and productivity is competition. But, under the current steady state of the concentration level within the banking industry, it is impossible to be realized. Sometimes the interest rates on deposits do not compensate even for inflation levels or returns on deposits are negative" (Aliu, 2015, p. 3).

With the current super risk-adverse lending policies, the banks in Kosovo are instigating lack of trust in banks by consumers, which have their defined preferences, and act in accordance with promoting their self-interest (McFadden, 2006). The lack of trust, therefore affects consumer behavior (including businesses), affecting their economic security and affecting the economy as a whole, especially in a country where the banking industry is

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28   Cases included respondents from Pristina, all users of banking services, male and female, of different age and employment status.

the only source of financing business investments and part of private consumption of the population. Logically, this process continues to affect the economic security of all the people in the country, including here their food security, and job security. According to economist Daniel Hameresh, there is consensus amongst a number of economists that "income levels and real growth depend upon trust" (Lack of Trust, 2012).

Key findings

Research findings show that perceptions of banks among interviewees were influenced by their level of financial literacy, basic needs related to their wellbeing and the ability to qualify for banking services under the bank policies. All interviewees have at one point had, or currently have a loan, and most of them never had taken out any business loans. Most of the interviewees were moderately financially literate, with one outlier who was extremely literate financially. Those whose financial literacy was higher and those whose was lower had no major differences in opinion when it came to concerns about the banking policies, especially rates on loans and services. This led to believe that while the lending activities of banks are affected by the demand side/the consumers, the preconditions were not.

In regards to trust, research findings show that despite interviewees' diversity, including age, gender, profession, level of education, social status, etc., most do not trust banks, though the concept of trust and understanding varied mildly, between a philosophical one and a pragmatic one, among them. Furthermore, the more rigid the level of distrust fueled by banking policies and high cost/interest rates of products/services towards clients, the lower the willingness to get another loan, which shows a direct correlation between trust and consumer behavior.

As for economic security, research findings show that those who got loans, most faced difficulties, if not in paying back the loan payments, then in having to restructure family budgets in order to cover basic needs, in which case, most needed the help of a partner, family, or else. Overall, most of our interviewees faced difficulties to cover basic needs and be able to upgrade their lifestyle. Also, some of the things that were not mentioned as basic needs but something worth saving for, pointed out that the living standard is quite low, hence the low expectations when it comes to what is a need versus what is a luxury. It was obvious that financial literacy is not very high among those who do use banking services, allowing them to be an easy prey to banking services/products that would adversely affect their economic security. There were also obvious unrealistic expectations in regard to what banks should provide, which is correlated with the financial illiteracy. Most of the interviewees were employed, but job security amongst all was extremely low, and the discrepancy between the monthly wage and

monthly living costs was extremely high, the wages being those that could not cover the expenses. Overall, the banking policies, in specific, the high interest rates on loans seemed to only further perpetrate the already low economic security even further.

Key Conclusions

The research findings show that that there is an overall local institutional failure (in this case "Competition Authority in Kosovo" and the Central Bank of Kosovo) to support a balance between the extreme risk-adverse policies of banks with the demand/consumer side ability to handle the results of these policies without adverse affects to their economic security. On the other hand, it was noticed that while most interviewees deemed the banks as institutions that did not at all consider the wellbeing of their consumers during their banking activities, with an outlier pointing out that as a business that was not its role, none factored in corporate social responsibility as a potential solution. The low level of financial literacy is only an additional culprit to the current situation, allowing for consumers to either have unrealistic expectations from banks, not pursue the addressing of their grievances through relevant institutions, or simply become complacent with the unfavorable banking policies (such as loaning preconditions and rates) even to the detriment of their own wellbeing.

Recommendations based on the case study

Considering the limitations of our study, which include the focus of the research in one location and the case study size, which allows us to extrapolate, but with certain limitations to the exact precision, it would be highly useful for the purpose of the study, to conduct country wide public opinion polls on the subject of lack of trust in financial institutions in Kosovo and its correlation to the economic security.

In order to deepen the research into the issues of lack of trust in financial institutions, causes of it, and remedies, as well as the correlation between lack of trust and economic security, further quantitative research should be considered, such a country wide public opinion poll on trust in financial institutions in Kosovo.

Vesna Kraljevic

Montenegro: Trust in the public institutions dealing with the protection of labour rights

Reliable institutions that protect labour-related rights and trust in these institutions of employees and people who are looking for employment are important for a healthy working environment. When institutions are dysfunctional and people do not have confidence in their capability to protect their rights encoded in labour contracts, labour and other relevant laws, negative cycle of distrust, fear and insecurity are prevailing on the labour market. In such a context, people are reluctant to approach institutions reporting the cases of violation of rights. When institutions are ineffective in protecting labour rights and people do not trust in their capacity to fulfil their role, they will continue to tolerate right violation because of the necessity to keep the job and provide means for living. They will work with feelings of fear, insecurity and that can develop numerous consequences on their physical and mental health. On the other hand, young people in Montenegro who do not have trust in these institutions may appear passive in terms of seeking employment, which can eventually turn into apathetic behaviour and lead to the so-called phenomenon of 'learned helplessness'.

Research objectives and methodology:

Objectives of research were to find out do the citizens in Montenegro have trust in institutions that protect labour-related rights, what are the reasons for that level of trust, did they experience violation of labour rights at work, and, if they did, what was their reaction. Also, objective was to find out what are the recommendations for improving and enlarging trust in these institutions.

We used qualitative and quantitative method – combination of data from different sources: interviews, analysis of documents, desk research and poll method.

Qualitative research included a total of 10 employees who have experienced some kind of violation of labour rights in their work places, most often in the private sector. We also conducted 5 interviews with employees in the institutions dealing with the protection of labour rights, namely: Administrative inspections, the Labour Inspection, the Agency for Peaceful Settlement of Labour Disputes, Ombudsman – protector of human rights and freedoms, the Union of Free Trade Unions of Montenegro. We did desk research about this topic and also quantitative research within young people at Montenegro by poll method with questionnaire specially created for this research. Research was conducted in period from February to July 2016.

Relevant Context

Government of Montenegro – Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare in the Report on Human Development (NHDR) – "The Informal Economy: Overcoming Exclusion and Marginalization" [29] marked that the labour market in Montenegro is characterized by low activity of the working age population, a relatively high unemployment rate, especially of the young and vulnerable groups, the lack of a sufficient number of new jobs, as well as the lack of quality jobs. Like the rest of Europe, Montenegro, the last thirty years were characterized by the so-called negative demographic trends.

Data received through the Labour Force Survey conducted by Statistical Office of Montenegro – MONSTAT in the first quarter of 2016[30](in the observation period from January to March 2016) shows that 217.4 thousand persons or 80.9% are employed; 51.2 thousand or 19.1% of the population is unemployed. The number of employed persons in comparison with the previous quarter has decreased by 1.1% and the number of unemployed has increased by 7.1%. The activity rate for the first quarter 2016 is 53.7%, the employment rate is 43.5% and unemployment rate is 19.1%. Measures of the activity of the population for 15–64 age groups are: the activity rate is 62.7%, the employment rate is 50.6% and the unemployment rate is 19.3%.

This data shows that situation on labour market in Montenegro is not good, unemployment rate is high and people are ready to accept unfavourable working conditions just to be employed.

Also, in the last couple of years Montenegro has faced with numerous cases of violations of labour rights that are guaranteed by the labour law. One of the greatest forms of violation of this law is **informal employment.** Globally, informal employment is a widespread phenomenon and features not only an undeveloped country with inefficient institutions and lack of confidence in the government. Informal employment brings, except unpaid work experience and health insurance, other forms of violations of labour rights. The most common are: the inability of annual vacation which is provided by the law, failure to comply with planned working hours during the working week and breaks during the day, unpaid overtime and work during the holidays, impossibility of realization sick leave, etc. However, it is not rare that these rights are not respected among those who are formally employed, both in the private and the public sector.

In Montenegro, there are few institutions which deal with Labour rights. For the public sector, Administrative Inspection at the Ministry of Interior is responsible, and Work inspection at the Administration for Inspection Affairs is responsible for the private sector. Also, there is the Agency

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29   http://www.gov.me/ResourceManager/FileDownload.aspx?rId=214880&rType=2

30   http://monstat.org

for Peaceful Settlement of Labour Disputes, which is open to all sectors. Advisory services are provided even with institution of Ombudsman – who is most concerned with issues of discrimination, and Trade union can also help employees to achieve their rights.

Key findings

Quantitative survey conducted online with 952 young people[31] from various areas of Montenegro indicated that young people were not sufficiently informed about their labour rights, majority already has experience with some form of violation of labour rights and has no trust in institutions whose main task is to protect labour rights. Vast majority of respondents (72%) do not have trust in Labour inspection, 76% claimed that they do not have trust in Administrative Inspection, and 74% reported lack of trust in the work of Agency for Peaceful Settlement of Labour Disputes.

Respondents were asked to provide their opinion on the ways in which their trust in institutions, which are mandated to protect labour rights, can be increased. One of the most frequently proposed solution was depoliticization of these institutions (40% of respondents), while 34% of respondents think that institutions need to have more control over the inspectors' work. Among other solutions, respondents proposed the need for more independent work of institutions (10%), higher salaries of inspectors and officials in these institutions (7.1%).

There is prevailing opinion of respondents that that inspections do not react properly on regularities, and that their role is undermined due to the corruption. Only 6% of respondents thinks that inspectors are not corrupted, while 45% thinks that at least partly inspectors are engaged in corruption.

Qualitative, in-depth interviews with employees indicated that:

- **trust in public institutions dealing with the protection of labour rights is low**
- **employees are not informed about all the institutions which can protect their rights**
- **employees are not informed about all labour rights**
- **young and respondents with secondary education compared to those with a university degree are less informed about their labour rights**

On the other hand, interviews with respondents from the institutions which deal with the protection of labour rights indicated that during the last few years the number of citizens and employees, who individually or collec-

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31   Among them 442 (44%) of male and 530 (56%) female.

tively report labour rights violation and seek support from their institution, has increased. This indicates that trust in their work increased, as well as awareness and freedoms of citizens to pursue the justice for their rights violation. They think that the Labour Law is very good, but its implementation is problematic in various fields and aspects. Some of persons employed in institutions responsible for labour rights protection are reluctant and afraid when they have to react on irregularities, as they fear not to confront some influential employer with powerful political background.

Experiences of respondents employed in the public sector

Respondents employed in public sector (judicial and executive authorities) reported experience with mobbing. They have been exposed to insults, accusations, and tasks with too tight deadlines. At the same time, they were denied some of the basic welfare rights at work: the right to sick leave, the right to annual leave, the right to a break during working hours. Moreover, they were not paid for overtime work or work on weekends. The consequences of these situations at work they described mainly as damaged health, including mental health, which they described as stress and dissatisfaction.

They tried to report abuse of labour rights to the directors of their institutions, but they were instructed not to react, to keep silent if they want to keep their jobs and that it would eventually all come to an end at some point. **Fear of losing their jobs, or fear of marginalization and discrimination in society and difficulties in finding a job in the future were** the reasons for not reacting or initiating any court proceedings on the basis of the violations of labour rights. **Trust in institutions which might assist or intervene was very low and they believed that institutions would do nothing against the large state institutions in which they worked.** They claim that proving mobbing was difficult in the present system where victim has burden of proof. Also they think that their chances to win legal processes were very low because of the strong **political influence which protects their superiors** who are in fact the most responsible for the violation of their labour rights.

They expressed the opinion that system is not constituted to protect individuals (employees), but the institution itself and the employees who are in managerial positions. A significant positive change in their cases would be to hire an independent human resource manager – psychologist, who would be a link between employees and institutions, who would be independent and objective, and who could help them solve the conflicts and give information on how they can fight for the protection of their labour rights (who to contact and how).

59

Respondents from institutions which protect labour rights indicate that violation of labour rights in public sector was present mostly in terms of recruitment procedures and advertising jobs, failure to comply with legal deadlines for employment procedures, the illegal termination of employment, unpaid salaries for overtime work, the inability to settle claims of employees after the completion of bankruptcy proceedings, denial of the right to a pension due to unpaid social contributions, denial of severance pay, etc. The Ombudsman in the report for 2015[32] warned that discrimination was very present in many aspects but also in the area of labour and employment (including mobbing), with special emphasis on the labour rights of mothers. In the report the tendency of increased number of citizens and employees who individually or collectively seek help or report violation of labour rights during last few years was described. According to the respondents from institutions, following changes can contribute to more effective institutions in protection of labour rights:

- increase of the number of employees in inspections,
- increase of the professional capacities of employees in institutions which are dealing with labour rights through continuous education,
- improvement of the organization of institutions and inter-institutional cooperation,
- implementation of the sanctions and punitive measures in cases of violation of labour rights.

Experiences of respondents employed in private sector

Prevailing impression among all respondents was that labour rights are most often violated in the private sector. One of the most prevalent forms of labour rights violation is avoidance of payment of social contributions (disability, retirement, health insurance and insurance in case of unemployment). Other forms of violation of labour rights include: **irregularly paid salaries, overtime work beyond the legally stipulated working hours, unpaid overtime work, less vacation days, denial of right to take sickness leave, denial of maternity and parental leave, etc.**

The violation of these rights causes feelings of fear, insecurity, particularly in regard to the future, livelihoods, economic stability, health, security of children and family, security of job and opportunities for career development.

Respondents mainly do not react and do not report these cases of violation of labour rights. Main reason for that is lack of trust in institutions, but also lack of information about their rights, institutions and complaint

32   http://www.ombudsman.co.me/docs/Final_Izvjestaj_za_2015.pdf

procedures. They often fear that employer will find out about their complaints and that they will have problems to find employment in the future. During interviews, lack of trust in Labour Inspection appeared as the most prominent obstacle to claim their rights. As main reasons for poor performance of Labour Inspection respondents listed: lack of human resources (small number of inspectors), lack of their independence and political influence over inspection services, corruption, ineffective sanctioning procedures.

Research shows that employees are used to this situation in Montenegro. They accept it as something normal and expected, and they are not motivated to take more proactive approach to the protection of their labour rights. They feel that their chances are low as they act as individuals against companies that are more influential. Important factor which contributes to the lack of proactive stance is the situation on the labour market, which is marked by high level of unemployment, particularly among young people.

Experiences of minors employed in informal seasonal work

S. K. (16) lives with her mother and goes to school in Podgorica. During the summer she worked as a seller of ice cream in Budva. Her working time was 10 hours, the work was organized in shifts and she had one day off during the week. She worked on temperature around 40°C, with no toilets and appliances for refreshments (e.g. fan). She had no contract of any kind, salary was paid 'hands on', she had no insurance and the employer did not ask her parents' permission to work (as she was minor) which he was obligated to do by the law. She accepted the job because she needed money to buy clothes and shoes for the upcoming school year, and to financially assist her mother who was struggling to provide livelihood as a single parent.

S. K. was not informed about her labour rights and was quite satisfied with her work despite the described unfavourable conditions. She was satisfied with a regular salary. She was not aware that her labour rights were violated, and she considered working conditions as normal and expected for seasonal work. She was not familiar with institutions responsible for the protection of labour rights. She mentioned the court as the resolution of a dispute or conflict.

Conclusions

High rate of unemployment and the informal economy, the presence of a strong political influence in the field of employment and work of public institutions, insufficient transparency of work of institutions and companies affect citizens to feel afraid to react and fight for their rights and to have low trust in those institutions which are responsible for protection of labour rights guaranteed by the Labour Law.

Combined with an unfavourable labour market situation in Montenegro, low trust in institutions responsible for protection of labour rights cause a lot of dissatisfaction, insecurity to employees and affect them in several ways. Even though respondents personally experienced violation of labour rights in many ways, they are reluctant to complain to inspections or other relevant institutions due to the lack of confidence. Respondents also show gaps in the knowledge about their labour rights, and feeling of insecurity and fear for the loss of job and securing livelihood prevail.

Recommendations based on the case study

Recommendations suggested by the respondents, in order to increase trust in public institutions dealing with the protection of labour rights and in order to increase protection of labour rights, are to:

- stabilize and enhance controls and inspections in all sectors;
- reduce the political influence on work procedures, decision makers etc.;
- implement effective measures in the fight against corruption;
- increase the independence of the institutions;
- increase the capacity of institutions in terms of professional staff:
  - o increase the number of work inspectors,
  - o increase the professional capacities of employees through continuous education,
  - o provide human resource manager in all institutions and companies (independent);
- improve the organization of institutions;
- improve and make mechanisms for inter-institutional cooperation;
- modify and strengthen the punishments for employers in case of violation of the law
- increase the visibility of the work of institutions through media, etc.;
- educate citizens about labour rights (trough campaign, media, workshops, etc.);
- educate citizens about all institutions dealing with the protection of labour rights (through campaign, media, workshops, for students at high schools, universities, employers at public sector)

Marija Babovic
Stefan Stefanovic
Jovana Obradovic

Serbia: Trust in institutions of asylum seekers in Serbia

In 2015 Serbia has faced, like other countries on the Balkans route, with unprecedented migration flows of people moving from Syria, Iraq, other Middle East, Central and South Asia countries towards EU. According to the reports of the Commissariat for Refugees and Migration of the Republic of Serbia total of 579.518 refugees/asylum seekers have entered Serbia in 2015. Vast majority of them came from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan[33]. Twelve reception centers were organized with major ones in Presevo, at the Serbian-Macedonian border and in Sid and Adasevci at the Serbian-Croatian border.

Serbia was mainly transit country, and asylum seekers/refugees would stay shortly, only to recover and organize their further movement. However, when Hungary and Croatia closed their borders for refugees, number of asylum seekers increased in Serbia as they couldn't pass to EU zone as before. Eventually, Serbia also closed the borders but groups of migrants still continue to come to Serbia facing obstacles to reach EU countries. In such context, the question of human rights and human security of migrants remains crucial. Therefore, the aim of this case study is to show how migrants perceive main human security threats on their way to EU, with which institutions they interacted on their way, whether these institutions provide protection, do asylum seekers trust to these institutions and based on this trust, which migration and coping strategies they use? Does deficit of trust in institutions which should guarantee their rights to international protection makes them more prone to rely on informal migration channels and procedures exposing them to risks related to human smuggling and trafficking?

According to the ***UN Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees*** (henceforth Geneva Convention), '*the term refugee shall apply to any person who: ... owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it*' (Article 1). The Convention defines the rights of refugees:

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33   Commissariat for Refugees and Migration, Newsletter on increased flows of migrants in Republic of Serbia, January-December 2015, http://www.kirs.gov.rs/articles/navigate. php?type1=3&lang=SER&archive=1

- Not to be expelled except under certain strictly defined conditions (Article 32);
- The right not to be punished for illegal entry into the territory of a contracting State (Article 31);
- The right to work (Articles 17–19);
- The right to housing (Article 21);
- The right to education (Article 22);
- The right to public relief and assistance (Article 23);
- The right to freedom of religion (Article 4);
- The right to access the courts (Article 16);
- The right to freedom of movement within the territory (Article 26)
- The right to be issued identity and travel documents (Articles 27 and 28).

The *EU Directive 2011/95* on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection and for the content of the protection granted recognize that Geneva Convention and the Protocol 'provide cornerstone of the international legal regime for the protection of refugees' (preamble, paragraph 4) and takes same definition of refugee (Article 2, paragraph d).

Same definition of refugee is contained in the *Law on Asylum of the Republic of Serbia* (Article 2), while asylum is defined as 'the right to residence and protection accorded to a foreigner to whom, on the basis of a decision of the competent authority deciding on his/her application for asylum in the Republic of Serbia, refugee or another form of protection provided for by this Law was granted' (Article 2).

Description of data collection methodology:

This case study is based on qualitative research. A part of research was conducted during early 2016, while EU borders were still opened and migration flows facilitated and supported. This part of the research was conducted for UNDP in order to provide evidence for the assessment of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) targets in the national policies and EU accession agenda in relation to the groups of migrants that participated in the migration flows. The research included interviews with migrants, representatives of different institutions and organizations engaged in the support to migrants, and observation in reception centers. Second part of research included in-depth interviews with eight asylum seekers after closing borders. They were interviewed during May and June 2016 at Asylum Center in Krnjaca and Refugee Information Center in Belgrade.

Context

According to data provided by European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (Frontex), prior to the migration crisis in 2015 number of asylum seekers in Balkan and neighboring countries were just over 38,000 people. Those were mostly persons from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq. In 2015 the number of asylum seekers in Serbia has increased significantly.

In accordance with Law on Asylum, at the entrance to Serbia migrants could verbally or in written way announce the intention to apply for asylum in Serbia to the responsible representative of the Ministry of Interior. In this case, they were provided by the certificate that grants the access to the Asylum Center. During next 72 hours person had to report to the Asylum Office of the Ministry or to Asylum Center, and during next two weeks they had to submit the official application for the asylum if they wanted legal status in Serbia. In practice, due to the fact that vast majority of migrants wanted to move further to EU countries, they were registered, granted 72 hours stay in Serbia and provided with support in transportation towards EU (after closing Hungarian border, through Croatia). In practice, many migrants declared the intention to ask for asylum in Serbia, or submitted the asylum request, only to buy more time to organize movement further towards EU destination countries. Following graph shows the dynamics of announced intentions to request asylum in Serbia during 2015.

Chart 6: Intentions to request asylum in Serbia in 2015

Source: Commissariat for refugees and migration, Bulletin January-December 2015, Belgrade

Among migrants who entered Serbia, majority were men (73%), minors counted for 30% and more than half (52%) were Syrian nationals. In

2015 only 24 protection statuses were accorded in Serbia (Commissariat for refugees and migration, Bulletin January-December 2015, Belgrade).

Chart 7: Country of origin of refugees/asylum seekers transiting Serbia in 2015

Source: Commissariat for refugees and migration, Bulletin January-December 2015, Belgrade

After the EU-Turkey agreement in March 2016, and closure of borders in Hungary, Austria, Slovenia and Croatia, Balkan migrant route was closed and mass migration flows stopped. However, NGOs working with migrants reported that despite the closure, refugees continued to arrive to Serbia. About 150 new daily arrivals were recorded in Belgrade during April (NRC-Praxis Humanitarian Report, Serbia Refugee Response, April 2016). Vast majority of migrants does not seek asylum in Serbia but travels to the Hungarian border where a small number of official crossings are permitted daily and many more cross illegally.

According to the same sources, more refugees/asylum seekers were reporting of having been arrested and/or pushed back to Macedonia by the Serbian police. The refugees often only had their fingerprints and data taken, but were not issued any documents or given the possibility to seek asylum in Serbia. At the beginning of April, a number of refugees/asylum seekers (from Afghanistan and Pakistan) reported that the police in Belgrade were denying them the possibility to register, telling them for several days to come again the next day (NRC-Praxis Humanitarian Report, Serbia Refugee Response, April 2016).

Key findings:

We explored human security of asylum seekers along dimensions that are related to three types of freedoms contained in the UN concept of human security: freedom from fear, freedom from deprivation and freedom to

live in dignity. Freedom from fear is related to the physical safety, protection from threats that can endanger lives. Freedom from want is related to the economic security, satisfaction of needs that enable life out of deprivation and poverty. Life in dignity is related to the civic status, right to identity and culture, and respectful treatment in the community (UN General Assembly Resolution on Human Security – 66/290, 2012).

Our research shows that all of these freedoms were threatened among asylum seekers. Institutional responses did not provide sufficient protection against these threats and therefore their trust in institutions was undermined and their strategies were redirected towards irregular migration channels and procedures. Threats increased with closing borders as institutional mechanisms established during mass migration flows were disbanded and set back to the lower levels of operational capacities.

Threats to human security of asylum seekers

Freedom from fear

Asylum seekers fled from their countries due to war and violence and fear for their life and life of their family. But that was only the beginning of the long journey in search for international protection which was marked by continuous fear for their safety. Physical security related to the means of transit, exhaustion, health related risks, but also to exposure to risks of crime in cases of smuggling, human trafficking, physical violence, sometimes committed by those who should in fact provide their protection, were major human security threats experienced by our respondents.

According to their testimonies, they were mostly afraid during transit from Turkey to Greece via sea route. Boats were overcrowded, travel was organized during the night and there were usually a lot of children who didn't know how to swim. Fear from drowning was the most difficult moment for majority of them.

> *"On the boat which was 9 meters long there were 60 of us, boat was moving slowly and it was very dangerous... It was all happening during the night, at the open sea... I was very scared, that was the most frightening experience I've ever had, because there is nobody to help you if something happens. "*
>
> *(women from Iran)*
>
> *"The toughest thing was part of the trip that we traveled by boat. Those 4 hours on the open sea were the scariest thing that happened to me during my trip to Serbia."*
>
> *(women from Afghanistan)*

Some of asylum seekers traveled with their whole family and they feared not just for their own life but also for life of their children. A couple that was interviewed had a baby that was born just before they started their trip from Syria.

> *"We headed from Turkey (to Greece) by rescue boat. There were about 75 of us, we traveled 3 hours and was a very difficult time..."*
>
> *(man from Syria)*

Respondents were sometimes even more scared of patrol boats, as they would charge on their boats in attempt to deter them from arrival.

> *"There were a lot of people on our boat. A lot of small children as well. Then patrol boat came and started hitting our boat and water started to pour inside our boat. I thought we are going to drown."*
>
> *(man from Iran)*

Described encounter with patrol boats indicates inappropriate interaction with institution (border police) as this should be the institution that should be associated with protection even if the crossing was not conducted in regular way. In such a context institutions with primary function to provide security perform their duties in distorted way, violating human rights and threatening lives of migrants.

Freedom from want

According to asylum seekers' testimonies they were faced with deprivation during their journey. They often didn't have food and drinking water. Some of them were forced to drink water from rivers using wet tissue as a filter raising risks for their health.

> *"We all drank water from river. We knew it's not clean water and that we have to filter it so we did it with wet tissues that we had in our possession."*
>
> *(man from Syria)*

> *"In order to get water we first had to walk 2 hours from place where we were hiding to water source and then to get back."*
>
> *(women from Syria)*

Road from shores of Greece to Serbia our respondents crossed on foot walking during the night and hiding during the day. Due to long walks

(sometimes 13 hours a day), lack of food and water and bad weather conditions they were exhausted and experienced various health problems.

> *"The hardest part of the trip was through Macedonia. We walked for about 6 hours through mountains. We had water but didn't have food and I was traveling with baby. So it was really hard for me".*
>
> *(woman from Syria)*

> *"We didn't have proper clothes and it was raining so we were soaked wet. There wasn't any food and we were all tired from walking."*
>
> *(male from Iran)*

> *"Our group traveled through Macedonia. We would walk during the dark, from 8 in the evening to 9 in the morning and then we would hide and wait nightfall. It wasn't just walking but sometimes running as well it all depends on situation. During our trip we had to cross rivers, we were wet and we would sleep in the mountains without blankets."*
>
> *(women from Syria)*

Trip was especially difficult for children and older persons. In some cases, smugglers would leave somebody if it couldn't keep the pace with group.

> *"Some people from our group were too tired to continue and they needed to get rest, but smugglers didn't want to wait for them. So we just left them there."*
>
> *(man from Syria)*

However, deprivation was not only the consequence of avoidance of encounter with law enforcement in the countries on their route, but it was present even when they were accommodated in the refugee centers organized by authorities of transiting countries. Those who were accommodated for some time in camps in Greece and Macedonia reported on poor conditions. They were faced with lack of water and food and low hygiene in the camps. In some camps people would wait two or more hours to get bottle of water or food.

> *"Toughest thing was to wait 2 hours to get food or bottle of water. I saw one man who wanted to kill himself because he couldn't get enough food for his children. Rule in the camp was that you have to wait in line to get food whether you are child*

or grown up. I had money so I could buy food, but for those who didn't have money it was really tough."

(women from Syria)

Some of respondents were living in severe deprivation for longer period, several months, due to the long and complicated journey.

"We came to camp by bus. After couple of days we escaped from the camp and we took a cab to the border. On the boarder situation was really bad, we took tents and slept near the border. We were sleeping there for 3 months until we found smugglers that will take us to Serbia."

(women from Syria)

Freedom to live in dignity

Loss of citizens' status, documents that prove identity, dependency on others in provision of basic needs and security, exposure to stigmatization and treatment as they were criminals, all were experiences that undermined their dignity[34]. One of the basic rights – the right to international protection – was violated in many ways according to testimonies of our respondents.

"Me and my husband are from Afghanistan. We lived in Iran, but we didn't have any IDs so we were forced to do whatever they asked (government officials from small town where they lived in Iran). They said if we don't do what they asked us, we will have to go back to Afghanistan. We were really scared and that's why we left Iran and came to Serbia."

(women from Iran)

Uncertainty that institutions will grant their passage to desired destination country drives asylum seekers to look for irregular channels for their journey. However, the outcomes of deals with human smugglers are often uncertain as well. Sometimes smugglers fulfill their part of agreement, but sometimes not.

"From Iraq to Turkey we came with help of smugglers. When we came to Turkey we went to prison/camp for 16 days.

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34   In the Report of the Secretary-General from 2005 titled "In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all" it is stated that the Members States should not spare effort "to promote democracy and strengthen the rule of law, as well as respect for all internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms" (UN, 2005: 34). This means that dignity and respect are important as much as freedom from fear and want and that all human beings have right to live under the protection of human rights and under the rule of law.

It wasn't too hard for me, but I was afraid because of my children."

(women from Syria)

"Some people are still in the forest. Smuggler didn't want to wait and they were too tired to continue journey. When you are with smugglers you have to do whatever they ask you to do."

(man from Syria)

Experiences with institutions and organizations on their way to Serbia

Our respondents show low level of trust in institutions of countries they passed on their way to Serbia. Lack of trust is usually the consequence of inadequate treatment by police and poor conditions in refugee camps. The most striking testimonies were those that were describing the exposure to violence perpetrated by the police.

"Policemen in Greece were best and in Macedonia worst – they would yell and beat us. I was really scared."

(women from Syria)

"Bulgarian police were the meanest. They beat us and if you start to run they would unleash dogs on you."

(men from Syria)

"Police in Turkey and Greece was very good, but in Macedonia not that much. Policemen over there would beat people."

(man from Iran)

"Police in Macedonia wasn't good. One night police came and started hitting people for no reason. We stayed in Macedonia for one week. During that time, we didn't have any shelter and we slept in forest near campfire that another group started. We didn't have any kind of help while we were there. They didn't give us food or any kind of medical assistance".

(man from Syria)

"We had problem with police in Hungary. They had burned all clothes that we were carrying with us and then they send us back to Serbia."

(women from Afghanistan)

Sometimes respondents would compare the violence committed by police and violence perpetrated by criminal groups who were robbing them as equal threat to their security.

> *"We had problems in Macedonia. We were afraid of both police and criminal groups."*
>
> *(man from Syria)*

Respondents trust more to the international organizations then to police and public authorities. They are perceived as more reliable providers of assistance.

> *"The most trust I have in UNHCR because they were only one who helped us."*
>
> *(Women Iran)*

> *"There were a lot of organizations when we came to Greece. As soon as we arrived there they gave us water, and all the things we needed."*
>
> *(man from Syria)*

> *"First day we came, there were a lot of organizations (NGOs) that helped people, but as the days passed number of organizations started to drop down. I personally have trust in organizations, because that's the first time that saw person smiling and that they want to help.*
>
> *(women from Syria)*

Experiences with institutions and organizations in Serbia

When they came to Serbia asylum seekers already had contact with police and organizations in three countries (Turkey, Greece and Macedonia or Bulgaria) that they passed on their way to Serbia. They had mainly positive experiences with NGOs but opinion about police was mixed. The trust in police was higher in Turkey and Greece than in Macedonia and Bulgaria. Upon their arrival to Serbian border, respondents already had certain expectations based on the previous experience.

It should be bear in mind that testimonies of asylum seekers on their experiences with institutions in Serbia could be adjusted by the fact that they were interviewed within the institutional framework in which they were supported. It can be assumed that they would like to speak more about positive than negative experiences as they were dependent on that assistance. However, general impression is that basically their experiences were positive. Both, NGOs and public institutions such as police and Commissariat for Refugees and Migration that were assisting in their status regu-

lation and provision of support got positive reviews. While NGOs helped asylum seekers with food, water, clothes and information regarding asylum procedures, police and Commissariat registered them and provided shelter and medical assistance.

> *"Serbian police is very good. Only other country where we felt secure and relax as in Serbia was Greece."*
>
> *(women from Iran)*

> *"Situation changed as soon as we got in Serbia. As soon as we crossed the border, we got medical help, food, water and dry clothes."*
>
> *(women from Afghanistan)*

> *"We want to stay in Serbia. Here we didn't have problem with police and as soon as we entered we got food, clothes and medical assistance (she has a baby that needed to be checked). We took cab from border to park and when we arrived some organization helped us to find bus that is going to camp for asylum seekers."*
>
> *(women from Syria)*

> *"When we came to Serbia they give us clothes and food and then we went to bus that brought us to border with Croatia. Border was closed so we had to come back to Belgrade, where we asked for asylum. Police in Serbia is good and people are good as well."*
>
> *(male from Iran)*

> *"I have trust in Serbian institutions and I hope that I'll get asylum and that I'll be able to travel in other countries, because I have family that I left in Iran."*
>
> *(male from Iran)*

Various researches indicate that majority of persons who request asylum in Serbia does that only to obtain legal status while they organize further trip to EU countries where is their final destination. Therefore, the number of residents in asylum centers varies between 50 and 200.

> *"I don't want to stay in Serbia. I'm just here because I was injured and I couldn't continue my journey to Germany so I had to ask for asylum."*
>
> *(male from Syria)*

> *"Right now I have everything. I came to center because I needed medical assistance, but as soon as I get better I'm continuing my journey."*
>
> *(women from Afghanistan)*

"When I asked to get asylum I got place to stay, food and time to figure out what should I do now. So the main reason is not to stay in Serbia, but to get roof over my head, wait for weather to get better and to figure out how to go to EU countries, such as Germany, Sweden, etc. My mother and younger sister are in refugee camp in Germany. My plan is to go to Germany to reunite with them, and then to go to Sweden were I have uncle."

(male from Syria)

When they were asked about life in asylum centers, majority of asylum seekers were satisfied with food, clothes, medical assistance and accommodation. However, there were some gaps in support that were recognized by asylum seekers. The language barriers and lack of information about country and its culture is a big problem according to respondents.

Those respondents who consider possibility to settle in Serbia indicate obstacles to integration process. Besides language the problem is inactivity as they stay at asylum center not using their skills, not being active in any sense in the community.

"I came from Iran. Here in asylum center there is no classroom and we don't have teacher who could teach us Serbian language. How can we be part of this society if don't know language? There is nothing to do here in center, we have TV and that's it."

(male from Iran)

"Food is not problem, problem is not clothes, we need teacher of Serbian language."

(man from Syria)

"I think that all of us who want to stay in Serbia and begin our life here want also to work and learn language. How could I be a part of this society if I don't know how to say milk or bread when I go to market? I'm young and I'm engineer so I can work and I want to work, but I don't have work permit. So I'm spending my days in center watching TV and reading books."

(male from Iran)

Conclusions

Asylum seekers transiting through Balkans to EU countries or requesting asylum in Serbia faced diverse threats to their security during migration process. The threats include physical threats during the transit, due to the means of transportation, exhaustion, health risks, exposure to violence and maltreatment perpetrated human smugglers, traffickers, robbers and even representatives of institutions such as law enforcement. They face severe deprivation as they sometimes for longer period have no proper food, drinking water, nor safe shelter or proper cloth. They have lost their dignity as their citizens status, identity and social status are undermined during migration. They are sometimes treated with severe violation of human rights, with disrespect, stigmatization.

According to the testimonies of interviewed asylum seekers, they do not get in touch with many institutions. They mainly interact with police enforcement and authorities who organize refugee camps, humanitarian aid and health care on their route. The confidence in institutions is lower than confidence in non-governmental organizations. Interestingly, the respondents are able to identify the international organizations who assisted them, while among institutions they mostly recognize police (or different branches of police), and in Serbia Commissariat for refugees and migration which organizes asylum centers. Despite basic satisfaction with support in regard to the basic needs (food, shelter, health care), asylum seekers indicate important obstacles to their attempts to be better included in the community (language barriers, lack of education in local language, culture, inactivity, etc.).

It should be kept in mind that international protection is the mechanism by which all threats experienced by our respondents should be eliminated and their human security granted. However this basic right to protected status of refugee today is undermined by the restrictive policies of EU states. Therefore the provision of legal status to which they are entitled can be observed as main human insecurity.

"We only want to live without a fear, to have home."

(women from Iran)

Recommendations

Recommendations should be divided in two sets – one related to the provision of protection status and human security of asylum seekers during their migration and upon arrival to the destination country, and the other related to the preconditions for their integration in the community of settlement.

Recommendations related to status and transit of asylum seekers:

- Temporary protection status should be granted to vulnerable migrants in Serbia in order to allow them the access to basic services.
- Measures to facilitate transit and prevent human smuggling should be applied.
- Right to asylum should be respected and push-backs of migrants requesting asylum from the borders, and misdemeanor charges against asylum seekers should be eliminated.
- Procedure of deciding upon asylum requests should be more efficient.

Recommendations related to integration of asylum seekers:

- There should be an assessment of educational needs for asylum seekers in Serbia
- Educational support should be planed having in mind different multicultural and language background of migrants as well as their age and level of education
- Inclusion in pre-school education for children of asylum seekers should be priority
- Government of Serbia should introduce polices that are not only focused on humanitarian aid in case of asylum seekers but also on integration measures that will enable full protection and development of human capital. Those measures will help asylum seekers to integrate in society when they get asylum.
- Introduce measures that will enable asylum seekers to work while they wait for evaluation of their asylum application.

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Turkey: Trust In Turkey's Judiciary System And Its Municipalities

Research objectives and methodology:

This report aims to show the reasons for the loss of trust in the public authorities, specifically local authorities (municipalities) and judicial system through a case study. The case, analyzed here is a work accident happened in Istanbul, Zeytinburnu area in 2008; where 21 people died, and 117 injured in an explosion occurred in a small scale industrial complex, named Emek İş Hanı (an office block). Through examining the judicial process, we indicate in what ways the citizens lose their trust in public authorities. Our case study shows that the loss of confidence in state authorities is strictly related to the over self-confidence of the civil servants, due to the Law on Trying Civil Servants and Other Public Officials which has roots dating back to 1913, late Ottoman period. This particular legislation makes it extremely difficult to bring civil servants before the court in charge of liability. Consequently the civil servants feel almost free to put public safety in jeopardy.

Therefore the Turkish citizens have to compel not only the legal and administrative institutions but also to raise public awareness in order to get justice. In our case, the court process took six years and only a few minor civil servants got punished. The families, who lost their loved ones, struggled for six years to make the allegedly liable actors visible and to establish a public opinion about how the judicial system fails to provide justice.

Relevant Context:

Many surveys show that the trust in state authorities is decreasing in Turkey in the last decades. Among all others, the loss of confidence in local governments and the judicial system seems the most dramatic. The majority of these surveys point out corruption as the main reason for the loss of trust in public authorities. In many fields, especially in regards to local municipalities, the citizens report that they frequently experience petty corruption when they get involved in any business in municipal offices. On the other hand, the loss of trust in the judicial system has a more political tone. Surveys reveal that the political battle over the justice system, in other words, the competition among the political actors to control court decisions is the primary reason of the loss of trust.

Courts in surveys

One of the surveys we analyzed is the *Research on Socio-political Tendencies in Turkey* (Türkiye Sosyal-Siyasal Eğilimler Araştırması) biannually initiated by Kadir Has University. Since it provides temporally comparable data, this research gives many clues about the extent of the erosion of trust in public institutions. According to the 2011 survey, the courts are held in esteem by only 38,8 % of the respondents, but this rate decreased to 37.2 % in 2012, and 26.5 % in 2014. In the same poll, 59,7 % responded "no" to the question" if they believe the Turkish courts are independent". The rate of the respondents who believe that the courts are independent is only 24.2 % according to this survey.

Another periodic survey measuring the trust in public institutions is OECD's *Government at a Glance* reports. The 2015 version of this report indicates the changing tendencies in trust from 2007 to 2014. According to this survey (made by Gallup World Poll), the confidence in judicial system in Turkey decreased from 70 % in 2007 to less than 50 % in 2014. Thus, while the reliance on judiciary system has been higher than the average of OECD countries in 2007, it got lesser than this average in 2014 (p. 171).[35]

The trust in judiciary system is also one of the key questions surveyed in the electoral polls in Turkey. In the dense election environment of 2015, the independence of the courts was one of the fundamental topics on the public agenda. Thus, poll companies covered this issue in their regular surveys before the two general elections in June and November 2015. According to a study made by Metropoll Survey Company in June 2015, 57 % of the respondents think courts have lost their independence in the year before the elections in June. Comparing this data with their previous studies, Metropoll declared that trust in judiciary system was 8 out of 10 in 2007, but it regressed to 5 out of 10 in 2015.[36]

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35   In 2013, two investigations started against four ministers, their families and relatives. To stop the investigations, the government changed the law related to the regulation of courts. According to the government, the Gülen movement was initiating a "judiciary coup" against the AKP, using power on the courts and prosecutors. Since then, the content and the regulation of the courts are still in jeopardy. It is obvious that the government tends to limit the independence of courts to prevent similar legal "interventions" to the state executives. Nevertheless, since the government's intervention to the courts has become even more obvious by this clash, the trust in the judiciary system dramatically decreased. According to the Chief Judge in the High Court of Appeals (*Yargıtay*), the trust in courts in Turkey is only 30 % due to the political contestation over judiciary system. Cumhuriyet daily, 26 April 2016.

36   Zete, 13 July 2015, https://zete.com/metropoll-anketi-cumhurbaskanligina-guven-surekli-azaliyor/

Municipalities in surveys

The trust in local governments (municipalities) has always been the lowest among all the public institutions in Turkey. However, in the recent years they became even more distrusted governing bodies. One of the reasons for this loss of trust is that they have lost most of their authority because of the changing trend in urban policy favoring an extensive administrative centralization. Through various changes in the legal infrastructure regarding urban spaces since 2004, the municipal authority has dramatically slid to the TOKI (Mass Housing Administration). However, municipalities still have power in crucial areas, such as delivery of gas and water, urban public transportation, garbage collection, regulation of parks and recreational areas, first phase control of workplaces regarding public safety (excluding workers' safety), etc. Thus, since they have always been having a direct connection with the living spaces, citizens' trust in municipalities become a crucial point in the maintenance of everyday life in the urban areas. Unfortunately, almost all the surveys indicate that the reliability of municipal institutions have diminished dramatically year by year.

In *Corruption in Turkey 2015* report of the Transparency International, 13 % of respondents claim that they were either charged unjustifiably by municipal servants or had to give "gifts" to fasten their business. The report indicates that among all others, the municipal offices are the first in illicit charging or "gift" issues. Nevertheless, the 88 % of the respondents state that they made no legal complaint about such illegal charges. The two main reasons why these people refrained from making legal complaints are of importance in revealing the link between the distrust in the judiciary and increasing distrust in all public authorities: 60 % believe such complaints would not generate any result and 20 % were afraid of possibility of adverse outcomes.

Another report, published by TESEV in 2014, titled *Evaluation Report on Corruption and the Struggle against Corruption*, describes the scene in a similar way. In this survey, one of the questions is "Which of below professional groups did ask you for extralegal charges or gifts in turn of solving your problems:" 13 % of respondents point police officers, 12 % municipal officers, 11 % tax officers and another 11 % the members of municipal councils. Another question in the same survey asks in which public office the corruption increases the fastest: 48 % point the big companies in the private sector, 47 % custom officers, 45 % central administration, 44 % municipal offices, 44 % city councils, and 40 % prime ministry.

The same report indicates how the petty corruption in municipalities is normalized among the citizens. The answers to a question asking which behaviors of municipal officers are acceptable reveal the degree of this normalization: The most popular answer checked by the respondents is "invit-

ing a free dinner/lunch in turn of solving a personal problem" (29 %), "receiving a gift" (10 %), "accepting a favor" (10 %), "receiving cash" (ten %).

Key findings in the case of Blast in Davutpasa

In Turkey, four people per day die in their workplaces due to the accidents. Since the AKP government's ambitious politics on economic development rely heavily on the riskiest sectors, such as construction, mining, energy production via dam projects, and since safety measures make the production and the cost of labor more expensive, the government does not apply all legal measures regarding worker's safety.[37]

Although there is a huge propaganda spread by the government institutions, trying to persuade the public opinion that workers are dead because of their personal carelessness, many news reports based on the eyewitnesses and the specialists do indicate the responsibility of both related governmental agencies and employers in those fatal accidents.[38] In many incidents, after unbearably long trial processes, the courts also have been deciding that neglect in workers' safety of both state institutions and employers result in tragic consequences.

The case we analyze in this report is one of the most notorious trials related to the fatal workplace accidents. During 6-years trial, both central and local authorities resorted to every possible way of legal manipulations to prevent an effective investigation. Even the prosecutor was not permitted to make proper investigations on the explosion. Due to legal regulations

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37   Nevertheless, a new law issued by the AKP government has replaced the term "workers' safety" with "workplace safety". The new legislation (Law Number 6331, Health and Safety at Work Act) means a serious reduction of employers' responsibility directly affecting workers' safety. Furthermore, both the inspection responsibility and the authority of the state in the workplace are privatized and transferred to the companies and experts hired by the employers. In fact, although the previous regulations made both the state and employers more liable for workplace accidents, the courts never put this principle into practice. First of all, the state has never allowed any court to try a public officer for a workplace accident. Secondly, and maybe more importantly, workplace accidents have generally been seen as compensation cases by the courts and have rarely ended with punitive decisions for the liable parties. From this perspective, the new law institutionalized and legalized the practical situation in terms of the non-responsibility and (punitive) immunity of both the state and the employers, concerning the legal consequences of the violation of the measures of workers' safety.

38   http://www.guvenlicalisma.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=17462:is-kazasinda-isciyi-agir-kusurlu-kabul-eden-sistem-murat-ozveri&catid=130:makaleler&Itemid=240; http://www.guvenlicalisma.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=17453:yaptigimiz-binalar-iscilerin-mezar-tasi-oluyor&catid=130:makaleler&Itemid=240; http://www.guvenlicalisma.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=17494:sosyal-devlette-is-kazasindan-nasil-rant-saglanir-murat-ozveri&catid=130:makaleler&Itemid=240.

protecting public servants, these officials act recklessly that eventually legitimizes and systematizes illegalities.

An explosion killed 21 and injured 116 people on 31 February 2008 at Emek İşhanı in Davutpaşa. The public prosecutor prepared a report referring the responsibilities to not only the owners of the atelier but also the public offices that had the authority of inspection. According to the technical report, the owners of the atelier were guilty of illegal usage of their building while the public authorities including Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, Ministry of Labor and Social Security, Zeytinburnu Municipality and BEDAS (the electricity distribution company) were negligent. The court case could not start until November 2009, and so, the families initiated the Watch Movement (*Vicdan Nobeti*).[39] However the indictment related to the explosion did not include the public authorities that were indirectly involved in the blast, although the expert reports indicate the negligence of regarding state agencies, which have the duty /authority to control public and workplace safety standards. Thus the families decided to continue their Watch until all the responsible civil servants come before the court. After 39 weeks of Watch protest, the only progress in the court was the inclusion of the mayor and five officers of Zeytinburnu Municipality together with the Istanbul Regional Director of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security to the case. The prosecutor accused these officers on grounds of reckless homicide and malpractice. Then the families gave a break to the Watch protests.

According to the expert report on the deadly blast the following parties were responsible for malpractice and/or negligence:

1. The owner of the atelier, Selçuk Başlar, for illegally producing fireworks in his workplace.
2. Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, for delivering public services to the building although it does not have required permissions for industrial production.
3. Zeytinburnu Municipality, for neglecting their responsibility to control the building and production activities regarding public safety.
4. BEDAS (Electric Company), for delivering electricity to the building.
5. Ministry of Labor and Social Security, for neglecting their duty to control the building regarding workers' safety.

However, none of the public institutions and or officials were included in the first indictment since the Ministry of Interior Affairs did not let the court to initiate an investigation based on the Law on Trying Civil Servants

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39 Starting with this case, the Watch Movement became a monthly protest in İstiklal, happens on the first Sunday of every month with the participation of many families who lost their loved ones in different workplaces, journalists, and activists.

and Other Public Officials. Thanks to the objections of the families and the prosecutor, the court had the necessary permission to include Zeytinburnu Municipality in the second indictment and the trial started. However, the mayor and the officers of Zeytinburnu Municipality denied standing before the court until the court decided their arrest in case they did not appear in the room. This behavior also prolonged the decision process. Murat Aydin, mayor of Zeytinburnu, in his defense, stated that it was not because of negligence but due to scarcity of the resources and the limited number of officers they could not insect the building before the blast. The workers testimonies however were refuting the mayor's statement. According to their testimonies the municipality officers had visited their workplace several times and "chatted with their boss instead of checking what has been going on there."

Since the lawyers of the Municipality objected to the first expert report, the court ordered a second one. According to the second report, the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, Zeytinburnu Municipality, and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security were not held responsible. The only responsible parties were the officers of Zeytinburnu Municipality due to their careless execution of their duty in inspecting the building. Only one of the members of the expert council made critical notes upon the report about responsibility of the other parties and the advocates of the families objected the court made their decision to the second report.

The court made its decision on 14 July 2014, almost six years after the blast. The court found five officers of Zeytinburnu Municipality (Ferruz Kutsal, Rüstem Tekin, Servet Kırma, Şevket Yıldırım and Hatice Küçükakyüz) guilty of the negligence and consequently causing the death of 21 people. Remzi Koçyigit and Resul Koçyigit, the owners of Emek İşhanı were also sentenced for illegally initiating industrial production in their building. However, the wording of the court decision was revealing the incompetence of the trial process:

"It is evident that the municipal officers knew the owners of the atelier were illegally producing firework, but they protected him and ignored this illegal production."

The case we analyzed shows how the public awareness is crucial in the judicial process related to the claims of people's security not only in the workplace but all the domains of life. In our case, instead of accepting conventional trial process, the families of the death workers started a protest to inform general public how the judicial rules are not applied to the state officers and how different actors of state protects themselves from the punitive measures. Thanks to the visibility of the court process they got a relatively fair decision, and this is the first case in Turkey, that a mayor stands before the tribunal about a workplace accident, although he was not found guilty.

This case has three main points indicating to what extent trust in public institutions and human security are related to each other:

1. Before the blast, almost all the related state agencies collaboratively ignored an atelier illegally producing explosives and threatening the public safety.

2. During the trial, the court has also seemed reluctant to include the state agencies to the case. There are two possible reasons for this apparent reluctance: First, including the state agencies to such a trial needs a lot effort to make an adequate investigation, considering the law protecting state officers from being tried. Second and may be the most important reason is the ideological stance of the judiciary system in Turkey. The role of the judiciary, as is the case with other institutions of the state bureaucracy, has always been to "protect" the state power. As the surveys mentioned above show, it is very hard to claim that the judiciary is unbiased and independent in performing its duties.

3. In spite of all its (functional and institutional) dependencies the decision of the court indicates a slight resistance to the institutional and political pressure on the decision-making process. The court members, in many places in the text of the decision, allude the court could not make necessary investigation because of the central authority (the Ministry of Internal Affairs) did not give the permission.

Conclusions

In our case, the courts appear as unreliable institutions due to their weakness before the state executive and their dependence on the political atmosphere. This situation turns the courts into unreliable milieu for the citizens who seek justice or claim their rights. In such an atmosphere, public agencies and officers under the protection of law, do not refrain from committing negligence or engage in corrupt practices, petty or grand for that matter. Thus we can conclude that an ineffective judiciary system guarantees the loss of trust in all public institutions.

However, this attitude of the judicial system threatens the citizens' quality of life and even – as in Davutpaşa– abstain from protecting their basic human right, the right to live. For years, that firework atelier produced explosives in a highly populated building, originally constructed as an office space. The municipality ignored all the inappropriate conditions and illegal production there. The central state agencies did not even know anything about this place. Apparently, on the other hand, there was no petition from a worker or a neighboring workplace to any public institution, either. Even

this point indicates how the distrust to public authorities can be fatal for everyone.

Recommendations based on the case study

- Civilian surveillance of working conditions: increasing civil initiatives to work on workers' health and security issues, enhancing existing ones by equipping both with field and legal knowledge
- Public-civil cooperation: constantly keeping workplace surveillance for workers' health and security issues on the agenda by developing collaboration facilities with regarding public authorities. Related projects may be developed for municipalities. Pilot projects may be useful to transform municipalities' surveillance and sanctioning mechanisms thereof into more efficient means.
- Legal support: providing legal support for families of workers that lose their lives while working, and support civil initiatives that provide such facilities. Expert groups may be formed in bar associations to watch judicial processes.
- Increasing public awareness: existing civil initiatives may be increased to extend public awareness for lobbying on behalf of workers' health and security care.
- Recommendations for countries – governments, parliaments, parties: It is required to develop extensive lobbying and public awareness to force governments in order to exercise their powers efficiently in workers' health and security issues. Currently in Turkey, legal regulations to provide and to sustain workers' health and security issues are almost up to international standards in black-letter law, however in practice the figures of deadly work accidents are phenomenal. Therefore mechanisms should be developed to apply legal requirements; for instance ILO and Turkey's unions may cooperate to develop projects in order to scrutinize reasons of workplace accidents and to improve measures to prevent them which may later be transformed into an action plan.
- Recommendations for EU and regional institutions: increasing figures in deadly work accidents may be brought before EU in order to demand a comment from Turkey. Even if such a demand may not be addressed properly, it would gain extensive visibility for workers' health and security issues. Also, precautions for workers' health and security may be a component in companies' EU compatibility licenses.
- Recommendations for the CSOs: Deadly work accidents keep on increasing especially in construction sector all over the Balkans. Civil

watch initiatives may lobby against companies that run worksites with higher deadly accidents in order to prevent them getting contracts from governments and other public institutions.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Trust in institutions in the region of Balkans and Turkey is relatively low. Security institutions (such as police and army) are more trusted than governance institutions (national/state level governments, national/state level parliaments, local authorities, and judiciary), while citizens have the least confidence in political parties. Citizens of Balkan countries and Turkey trust more in EU institutions than in their own institutions. This confidence in EU institutions is even higher among citizens of Balkan Region and Turkey than among citizens of EU Member States. This is worth of further investigation. Based on the data presented in this report it can be assumed that partly this higher trust comes from the more advanced rule of law in EU area in comparison to Balkan countries and Turkey where clientelism, party patronage and corruption still remain important structures that underpin institutions paralleled with the dissatisfaction of EU citizens with democratic deficit in EU institutional building.

Data on the level of achievements in regard to the rule of law, development of democracy, control of corruption add to the picture by indicating relatively low ranking of the countries along these indicators. Western Balkan countries (Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo*) have experienced significant progress in the rule of law and control of corruption after the decade of wars, political and economic disorder during 1990s. In Bulgaria there are some inconsistent tendencies, with variable progress in the control of corruption, while in Turkey there are some reversible trends in this area and in development of democracy.

Country specific case studies reveal in more details how dysfunctional institutions affect citizens' perceptions of security in various aspects: security and rights at workplace and in employment (Montenegro and Turkey), social security in case of displacement, overall (physical, economic, social) security in case of refugees moving from Middle East through Turkey and Balkans toward EU countries in search for international protection (Serbian case study), security from crime (Bulgaria). These case studies documented the gaps in the institutional performance that have impact on various aspects of human security of individuals and groups in the region. Each case study contributed with knowledge on particular insecurities and with suggestions how particular institutions can be improved in order to provide more effective security of people in the area of their mandate.

Basically, more transparent and accountable, legally defined and publicly controlled institutions should be the target of intensive policy interventions. Here are proposed some recommendations that can be used for future action of Citizens' Network for Human Security in order to contribute to the more effective and trustful institutions in the Region:

- EU level – the process of EU accession is presently main driver of reforms of institutions and promotion of the rule of law, and this process should be used for further advancements:
  - o Country progress reports should be monitored by civil society and complemented with shadow reports grounded in the solid evidence on the situation and gaps in institutional performance and rule of law in provision of human security.
  - o Civil society can advocate for more emphasize in conclusions and country specific recommendations delivered by EU based on countries progress reports in direction of strengthening independent bodies and civil society in monitoring and controlling national institutions in performing roles as providers of various aspects of human security.
  - o EU should be asked for more direct support to civil society organizations in their performance of social accountability actions in regard to the institutional performance in regard to the human security.
- Regional level – there are initiatives available at regional level due to the Regional Cooperation Council and South East Europe 2020 strategic framework (SEE 2020) which can be used as mechanisms for regional cooperation in this matter:
  - o To enable more systematic and intensive cooperation among civil society organizations in national and cross-country social accountability practices (exchange of experiences, joint initiatives, etc.) that are focused on institutional performance in relation to human security.
  - o To use SEE 2020 policy framework to conduct more systematic and detailed research in the Region in order to produce systematic and solid evidence on reliability and accountability of institutions.
  - o To advocate for more transparent and accountable regional mechanisms that are presently not sufficiently visible even to expert and NGO community, and particularly to citizens and to evaluate their contribution to the various aspects of human security in the Region.
  - o National governments in the region should be requested to work more close in developing and supporting the programs leading to reconciliation and peace building amongst the Balkans countries, especially the countries that have been in conflict in 90's. NGO's can support the process through network activities and outreach of such efforts.

- o Civil society engaged in support to the refugees and asylum seekers should cooperate on more systematic grounds in order to influence institutional practices that are violating human rights and threatening human security of migrants (refugees and asylum seekers).
- o Increased labour mobility and low protection standards should be target of advocacy at regional level, and civil society should request more support in this action from ILO.
- At national level:
  - o To contribute to the institutional reform and performance in accordance with rule of law principles by solid evidences obtained through quality research, monitoring and evaluation;
  - o To contribute to the open government framework by building web portals and platforms where citizens can get insights in laws and policies before and after they are enacted and endorsed. The experience of some good examples from Bulgaria (www.strategy.bg) and Serbia (http://www.otvoreniparlament.rs/) with web platforms can be shared.
  - o Building civil society platforms and forums on more permanent grounds for the purpose of exchange of experience, raising awareness, conducting research and advocacy actions aiming for more transparency and accountability, particularly in regard to the key actual human security threats and issues.
  - o To establish and maintain more control over functioning of political parties and their interaction with political, judicial and economic institutions.
  - o To promote human security perspective in institutions responsible for the different aspects of human security provisions, particularly inspections which should be aware of the consequences on human security by their malpractice.

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